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VENUE TRANSFER WHEN A COURT LACKS 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION:  WHERE ARE 
COURTS GOING WITH 28 U.S.C. § 1631? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Courts use venue to balance the plaintiff’s choice of forum with 
protections of fairness and convenience for defendants.1  Venue transfer 
is one aspect of venue that Congress created to improve the efficient 
change of courtrooms when either the public or the defendant demands 
a more convenient forum.2  The original venue transfer provisions, 28 
U.S.C § 1404(a)3 and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a),4 are meant to be easy to follow, 
but they have created complications when courts have used them to 
transfer cases when they lack jurisdiction over the defendant.5  As a 
result, venue transfer lacks the certainty that lawyers typically rely on, 
wastes judicial time, and wastes resources. 6  Courts have tried to use 28 
                                                 
1 See 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 110.01 (3d ed. 2004).  
Venue statutes are concerned with convenience.  Id.  For example, § 1406(a) “was in 
keeping with the general trend in legislative changes affecting federal court procedure ‘of 
removing whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases 
and controversies.’”  Id. § 111.31.  Congress meant for § 1404(a) to have a broad remedial 
purpose to prevent wasted time, energy, and money.  Id. § 111.11.  Further it protects 
litigants, witnesses, and the public against inconvenience.  Id.; see also David E. Steinberg, 
The Motion to Transfer and the Interests of Justice, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 443, 452 (1990) (“The 
section 1404 transfer assumes that the long-run efficiency gains resulting from the litigation 
of a case in a more convenient forum will outweigh the immediate costs that accompany a 
transfer.”). 
2 “While there is no definitive list of factors that must be considered, courts typically 
look to some or all . . . ’public’ ‘and private’ interest factors to determine whether the 
proposed alternative forum would better serve the convenience and interest of justice 
requirements.”  MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 111.13. 
3 See infra note 52 and accompanying text (providing the language of § 1404). 
4 See infra note 69 and accompanying text (providing the language of § 1406). 
5 See infra Part II.B (explaining how the function of § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) changed as 
courts utilized them when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant). 
6 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 111.02. 
What sounds like a simple exercise in determining which of the two 
statutes properly applies often can be complicated because, even 
though venue is technically proper because it complies with the 
applicable venue statute . . . some courts nonetheless define venue as 
“wrong” if some other procedural obstacle in the original court, such 
as lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, would have 
prevented the action from proceeding there.  In such a case, the courts 
also disagree as to which of the two statutes properly applies to effect 
transfer . . . .  Thus, what should be a straightforward exercise in 
determining which transfer statute applies, however, frequently is 
complicated by the courts’ use of different standards to determine 
when venue is “wrong.” 
Id. 
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U.S.C. § 1631 7  to solve these problems, but again, inconsistent court 
opinions prevent the statute from making venue transfer efficient.8  The 
result is that practicing attorneys have difficulty predicting the results 
following a venue transfer.9  This phenomenon is best illustrated by the 
following hypothetical.10 
Imagine that Kate, a defense lawyer, represents an Iowa citizen and 
Sally, a plaintiff lawyer, represents an Illinois citizen.  Kate’s client was 
served with a summons to an Illinois federal court one year and nine 
months after the occurrence of a cause of action with a two-year statute 
of limitations.  Initially, Kate is not worried because she knows that 
Illinois has no personal jurisdiction over her client, and hence, she will 
easily be able to dispense of the claim.  Kate first moves to quash service, 
which the court grants.  However, when Kate files a motion to dismiss 
for lack of personal jurisdiction, Sally moves for a change of venue.  Kate 
is still not worried.  She knows the only permissible forum is Iowa, 
where the statute of limitations is two years, and she will still be able to 
defeat the claim because two years have passed since the incident giving 
rise to the complaint.  By the time the action gets to Iowa and her client is 
re-served as required by Iowa law, the appropriate statute of limitations 
will have run.   
However, Sally specifically asks the court to transfer under § 1631.  
Sally asserts that § 1631 has superceded § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) in 
transfers by a court that lacks jurisdiction over the defendant.  Further, 
she explains that § 1631 demands that the action be deemed filed in Iowa 
on the day it was filed in the impermissible Illinois forum.  Kate realizes 
                                                                                                             
Courts have struggled with the application of the federal transfer of 
venue statutes since their enactment in 1948.  Simply worded and 
widely invoked, these provisions have proved difficult to interpret less 
for what they say than for what they omit.  The resulting case law has, 
in the words of one judge, produced a “nearly hopeless muddle of 
conflicting reasoning and precedent.” 
Robert Finzi, The 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) Transfer of Time-Barred Claims, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 975, 
977 (1994).  Mr. Finzi also asserts that more than 2,000 claims were transferred under 
§ 1404(a) alone in 1982.  Id. at 977 n.9. 
7 See infra note 174 and accompanying text (setting out the language of § 1631). 
8 See infra Parts II.C, III.B (explaining the inconsistent application of § 1631 and 
discussing the effects of the inconsistent applications). 
9 See infra Part II.B (discussing the scattered results of venue transfer when a court lacks 
personal jurisdiction). 
10 The following hypothetical is loosely based on the factual situation that occurred in 
Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967).  However, the names, laws of the states, 
and the lawsuit are purely fictional, and it is purely coincidental to the extent that such a 
fact pattern does exist. 
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that this transfer means the Iowa statute of limitations no longer bars 
Sally’s claim.  The court responds to Sally that § 1631 will not be used 
because the court believes that § 1631 only works when a court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Instead, the court determines that the 
transfer will take place under § 1406(a).  Kate lets out a sigh of relief 
because she knows that under § 1406(a) the new forum applies its own 
state law when the case arrives.  As a result, Sally will have to re-serve 
Kate under Iowa law and her action will be barred by the Iowa statute of 
limitations.   
However, the court surprisingly determines that the Iowa court must 
apply the longer Illinois statute of limitations of four years.  Therefore, 
Sally’s claim will not be barred by the statute of limitations.  Kate cannot 
believe the result and only wonders when and how a simple venue 
transfer became so complicated and unfair. 
This hypothetical represents the problems today with venue transfer 
when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant.11  Not even 
experienced attorneys can accurately predict what will happen with a 
cause of action after a venue transfer has been requested when the court 
lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant.12  The purpose of this 
Note is to advocate that § 1631 must be amended to (1) clearly establish 
that it is the transfer provision to use when transferring to a different 
venue due to a lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction,13 and (2) it 
must be amended to take into account fairness to defendants so that a 
plaintiff’s claim is not preserved indefinitely. 14   Part II of this Note 
focuses on the background of venue transfer. 15   Specifically, Part II 
explains the purpose of venue transfer, 16  why and how its purpose 
changed,17 how that change created an inefficient system,18 and how 
                                                 
11 See infra Part III (explaining the efficiency problems caused by venue transfer when a 
court lacks jurisdiction). 
12 See infra Parts II.B–C (discussing the scattered results that courts have reached in 
applying venue transfer provisions, which has created a system with uncertain rules). 
13 See infra Part IV (proposing an author-created amendment to § 1631 that will make 
venue transfer efficient again). 
14 See infra Part IV (proposing an author-created amendment to § 1631 to be more fair to 
defendants). 
15 See infra Part II (discussing the legal background of venue transfer, venue transfer 
when a court lacks personal jurisdiction, and the application of § 1631). 
16 See infra Part II.A (explaining the function and purpose of venue transfer from forum 
non conveniens to the transfer provisions of § 1404(a) and § 1406(a)). 
17 See infra Part II.B (discussing how the purpose and function of venue transfer changed 
as a result of the Goldlawr decision). 
18 See infra Part II (discussing § 1404(a), § 1406(a), forum non conveniens, and case law 
applying § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) when a court lacks jurisdiction). 
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courts tried to utilize § 1631 to restore efficiency to venue transfer.19  
Finally, Part II explores the different interpretations of § 1631.20  Part III 
of this Note analyzes the problems with lack of personal jurisdiction 
venue transfer, 21  the reasons that § 1631 was used in an attempt to 
resolve those flaws,22 why § 1631 fails to resolve those flaws,23 and the 
flaws of § 1631 itself.24  Part IV of this Note proposes amendments to 
§ 1631 that will restore efficiency to venue transfer and alleviate the 
problems with the statute itself. 25   Specifically, the amendment 
incorporates language that clearly establishes § 1631 as the venue 
transfer statute to use when a court transfers to a different venue because 
it lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant, which will conserve court 
resources and provide a reliable, certain rule for lawyers to follow.26  
Additionally, the amendment strikes particular language that is 
detrimental to defendants.27  Taken as a whole, the amended statute will 
preserve valid plaintiff claims, account for fairness to the defendant, and 
apply uniformly and efficiently.28 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND OF VENUE TRANSFER WITHOUT PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION 
This Part explains that if a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant, a venue transfer wastes judicial time and resources and also 
creates uncertainty for lawyers.29  First, Part II.A explores the original 
purpose and function of venue transfer beginning with forum non 
                                                 
19 See infra Part II.C.1 (presenting why the Ross court felt the need to utilize § 1631 
because venue transfer had become so complicated and inconsistent). 
20 See infra Part II.C (explaining some of the various applications, narrow and broad, of 
§ 1631). 
21 See infra Part III (outlining the problems with venue transfer when a court lacks 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant). 
22 See infra Part III.B (describing that § 1631 almost remedied the problems with venue 
transfers when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant). 
23 See infra Parts III.B.1–3 (displaying the problems with § 1631 and setting the 
groundwork for  the amendment). 
24 See infra Part III (analyzing the reasons that § 1631 needs to be amended to reclaim 
efficiency with venue transfer). 
25 See infra Part IV (providing the suggested amendments to § 1631 to resolve the 
problems that venue transfers have caused when a court lacks personal jurisdiction). 
26 See infra Part IV (explaining the need for such an amendment so that § 1631 will apply 
uniformly and make venue transfer more efficient). 
27 See infra Part IV (explaining the need for such an amendment because § 1631 takes 
away defendant protections with choice of law, specifically the statute of limitations). 
28 See infra Part V (providing a brief conclusion that details the reasons the proposed 
amendments to § 1631 balance the interests involved with venue transfer). 
29 See infra Part II (discussing the legal background of venue transfer provisions and 
their application when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant). 
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conveniens and ending with the most common venue transfer provisions 
of § 1404(a) and § 1406(a).30  Second, Part II.B explains that the function 
of § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) changed when courts began to transfer cases in 
which they lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants.31  Part II.B 
also discusses the reasons that venue transfer became inefficient as lack 
of personal jurisdiction transfers intersected with choice of law doctrines 
pertaining to § 1404(a) and § 1406(a).32  Finally, Part II.C explores why 
courts began using § 1631 as well as the different interpretations of how 
§ 1631 should function.33 
A.  Purpose and Function of Venue Transfer 
The purpose of congressionally created venue34 rules is to promote 
convenience and fairness for both the parties and the court.35  In terms of 
                                                 
30 See infra Part II.A (discussing the general transfer provisions § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) 
and their ancestor, forum non conveniens). 
31 See infra Part II.B (discussing the application of § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) after the 
Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962), decision). 
32 See infra Part II.C (showing that courts are split on whether to apply Goldlawr to 
overcome choice of law obstacles as well). 
33 See infra Part II.C (exploring the various applications of § 1631 in the post-Goldlawr 
era). 
34 Venue is defined as:  “The proper or a possible place for the trial of a case.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 745 (2d Pocket ed. 2001). 
35 Mitchell G. Page, Comment, After the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990:  Does the General 
Federal Venue Statute Survive as a Protection for Defendants?, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1153, 1160 
(2003). The author asserts that both venue and personal jurisdiction are characterized as 
protections for the defendant, and he notes a distinction between the purpose of personal 
jurisdiction and venue.  Id. at 1159–60.  Personal jurisdiction is a guarantee that defendants 
receive treatment in a manner consistent with the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  Id. at 1158.  Thus, personal jurisdiction is a question of whether a 
court has power over a person.  Id. at 1159.  On the other hand, venue regulations do not 
raise constitutional concerns and are only thought of  as additional protections for the 
defendant.  Id.  This particular comment argued that the International Shoe test for personal 
jurisdiction, which provides that a defendant must have certain minimum contacts with a 
state to avoid offending traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, only focuses 
on the minimum contacts aspect of due process.  Id. at 1159–60.  The author noted that the 
only time in the past sixty years that a court relied on the “fair play and substantial justice 
inquiry” was in Asahi Metal Industrial Co.  v. Superior Court.  Id. at 1160; Asahi Metal Indus. 
Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113–16 (1987).  Thus, the author concludes:  “It is the venue 
rules promulgated by Congress, and not the Due Process requirements of the Constitution, 
that primarily take into account the issues of convenience and fairness.”  Page, supra, at 
1160; see also Jeffrey J. Kanne, Note, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens:  History, 
Application, and Acceptance in Iowa, 69 IOWA L. REV. 975, 980–81 (1984).  This author 
determined that a decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, dealing with forum non conveniens, 
addressed the opposite interest of International Shoe v. Washington.  Kanne, supra, at 980; 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  
International Shoe recognized that a state has an interest in adjudicating actions closely 
connected to the state and expanded plaintiff rights by increasing the possible number of 
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fairness, venue statutes protect defendants against the risk that plaintiffs 
will select an unfair or inconvenient place for trial.36  The venue rules 
also account for the public interest, which may demand that the trial take 
place in a different forum. 37   Although venue provisions protect 
defendants and the public, plaintiffs retain the privilege of choosing the 
venue.38  As a result, plaintiffs hold a distinct advantage with venue 
because they determine both the location and the applicable law. 39  
Congress passed venue transfer provisions, such as § 1404(a) and 
                                                                                                             
forums.  Kanne, supra, at 980–81.  Meanwhile, Gulf Oil Corp. recognized that a state has an 
interest in not adjudicating actions that are loosely connected to the state and expanded 
defendants’ rights because it determined that a defendant’s right not to be burdened with 
an inconvenient and unjust forum must be balanced with a plaintiff’s choice of forum.  Id. 
at 981. 
36 Page, supra note 35, at 1161 (quoting the language from Leroy v. Great West United 
Corp., “the purpose of statutory venue is to protect the defendant against the risk that a 
plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial”). 
37 Id.  While venue protects both the defendant and the public, this Note specifically 
focuses on the protection it offers to defendants; therefore, the protection it offers to the 
public and how that has changed through the years is beyond the scope of this Note. 
38 See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955).  The Supreme Court declared that a 
court should consider the plaintiff’s choice of forum under a transfer.  Id. at 29.  District and 
circuit courts further stated that unless a forum is extremely inconvenient for a defendant, 
the plaintiff’s forum should rarely be disturbed.  See Gen. Portland Cement Co. v. Perry, 
204 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1953); Sun Oil Co. v. Lederle, 199 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1952); Ford Motor 
Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1950); Bergeron v. Sabine Dredging & Constr. Co., 281 F. 
Supp. 223 (D. La. 1968); Benrus Watch Co. v. Bulova Watch Co., 126 F. Supp. 470 (D.R.I. 
1954); Sherman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 122 F. Supp. 492 (D. Pa. 1954). 
39 Robert A. Ragazzo, Transfer and Choice of Federal Law:  The Appellate Model, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 703, 709–10 (1995).  Professor Ragazzo argues that a plaintiff’s venue privilege is well 
founded, and he points to Van Dusen v. Barrack, where the Supreme Court indicated that a 
court should give great deference to a plaintiff’s choice of forum.  Id.; see also Van Dusen,  
376 U.S. 612, 628–31 (1964).  Professor Ragazzo asserts that in the interest of efficiency and 
saving resources, plaintiffs, instead of judges, are given wide latitude to determine the 
initial forum.  Ragazzo, supra, at 710.  Also, allowing the plaintiff to select  venue involves 
fewer steps because the process would be much slower if the plaintiff had to communicate 
with the defendant to determine the proper venue before the litigation process even 
started.  Id.  Professor Ragazzo also asserts that defendants are protected by such concepts 
as personal and subject matter jurisdiction, and venue should only be reconsidered in very 
rare instances.  Id. at 708–09.  To do otherwise would undermine the goal of efficiency in 
allowing plaintiffs to choose in the first place.  Id. at 710.  Still, Professor Ragazzo admits 
that plaintiffs have an advantage with being able to choose the forum because they 
essentially influence the choice of law.  Id. 
 This Note discusses later how this advantage, although given credence, sometimes 
becomes known as forum shopping, which courts tend to dislike.  See infra note 74 and 
accompanying text (discussing why courts are concerned with some instances of plaintiff 
forum shopping). 
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§ 1406(a), to promote efficiency with venue in the federal procedural 
scheme. 40    
The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens is the ancestor for 
§ 1404(a) and § 1406(a). 41   Exploring forum non conveniens provides 
deeper insight into the specific purpose behind venue transfer and the 
reasons that Congress passed § 1404(a) and § 1406(a).42 
1. Forum Non Conveniens:  The First Form of Venue Transfer 
Prior to the existence of the federal transfer statutes, forum non 
conveniens was the only protection defendants had against plaintiffs who 
abused the venue provisions.43  Under forum non conveniens, a court can 
dismiss a case despite the fact that venue and jurisdiction are proper 
because a more convenient and proper forum exists for adjudication.44  
                                                 
40 The general venue statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000).  This statute states: 
(a) a civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of 
citizenship may, . . . be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any 
defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a 
judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions 
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that 
is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which 
any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action 
is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise 
be brought. 
Id.  Both § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) allow for transfer from one venue to another and are 
arranged under title 28, which is the same title where the general venue provisions such as 
§ 1391 are located, and so it appears that § 1404 and § 1406 are members of the venue 
family.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2000). 
41 See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the history, background, and generalities of forum non 
convienens). 
42 Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial 
System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 679–80 (1984).  Professor Marcus notes that even though it requires 
a court to dismiss an action, forum non conveniens is meant for situations in which a more 
convenient forum exists.  Id.  Thus, in 1948, Congress provided § 1404(a) as an alternative 
to forum non conveniens and dismissal, but it allowed for transfer to a court that was more 
convenient so long as venue and personal jurisdiction were proper.  Id.  Thus, although it 
included more than the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, the driving premise 
of § 1404(a) was to allow the case to be brought to a more convenient forum.  Id.; see also 
Annotation, Questions as to Convenience and Justice of Transfer Under Forum Non Conveniens 
Provisions of Judicial Code (28 USC § 1404(a)), 1 A.L.R. FED. 15, 30 (1969) (“The forum non 
conveniens provision of the Judicial Code of 1948, [is] in 28 USC § 1404(a).”). 
43 Marcus, supra note 42, at 679.  “Until 1948, transfer of cases among federal courts was 
impossible.  Dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens was the only remedy for abuse 
of venue provisions.  In 1947 the Supreme Court confirmed the availability of such 
dismissal as a matter of federal common law.”  Id. 
44 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (superceded by 28 U.S.C. § 1404); see 
also Kanne, supra note 35, at 980–82.  In Gulf Oil Corp., the Supreme Court endorsed the 
doctrine and determined that a court could decline jurisdiction and dismiss an action in a 
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The doctrine presupposes that another forum exists where personal 
jurisdiction and venue are proper for the case to be adjudicated.45  Courts 
still give the plaintiff’s original choice of forum great deference, but 
forum non conveniens gives defendants the opportunity to acquire a better 
forum if the original forum is unreasonable.46   
However, federal courts encountered problems when they applied 
forum non conveniens. 47   For example, forum non conveniens could not 
                                                                                                             
forum that was proper if a more proper forum existed, but only if jurisdiction and venue 
were initially proper.  330 U.S. at 504 (“This Court, in one form of words or another, has 
repeatedly recognized the existence of the power to decline jurisdiction in exceptional 
circumstances.”). 
45 Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 506–07 (“In all cases in which the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens comes into play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is 
amenable to process.”). 
46 For a particularly good summary of aspects a court considers under this doctrine, see 
Kanne, supra note 35, at 982–83.  However, the Court in Gulf Oil Corp. specifically stated 
some considerations and factors that would make a plaintiff’s choice unreasonable.  330 
U.S. at 508. 
If the combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are 
difficult to forecast or state, those to be considered are not difficult to 
name.  An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most 
pressed, is the private interest of the litigant.  Important considerations 
are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of 
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of 
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of 
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other 
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and 
inexpensive.  There may also be questions as to the enforceability of a 
judgment if one is obtained.  The court will weigh relative advantages 
and obstacles to fair trial.  It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by 
choice of an inconvenient forum, “vex,” “harass,” or “oppress” the 
defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to 
his own right to pursue his remedy. . . .  Factors of public interest also 
have place in applying the doctrine.  Administrative difficulties follow 
for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of 
being handled at its origin.  Jury duty is a burden that ought not be 
imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the 
litigation.  In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is 
reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in 
remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only.  
There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at 
home.  There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a 
diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must 
govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum 
untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself. 
Id. at 508–09. 
47 See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 58 
(1949). 
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apply in some controversies because of certain federal law restrictions.48  
As a result, sometimes a defendant would have to defend himself in an 
expensive and inconvenient forum, even when the necessary resources 
existed in an alternative forum.49  Also, the doctrine could be especially 
harsh and inconvenient to plaintiffs because courts had to dismiss the 
case, which forced plaintiffs to re-file in a new forum.50  These problems 
spurred Congress to pass laws that promoted efficient change to a new 
courtroom.51 
                                                 
48 See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 314 U.S. at 52.  In Baltimore & Ohio R.R., respondent 
Kepner originally filed his Federal Employer Liability Act claim in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York under a special venue provision within 
that Act that allowed the respondent to file a claim either where defendant resided or 
where he did a substantial amount of business.  Id. at 48–49.  Petitioner, an interstate 
railroad, tried to enjoin the respondent in a state court in Ohio, claiming that suitable local 
courts, both state and federal, existed besides the one where the respondent filed his claim, 
which was over seven hundred miles from most of the witnesses and evidence.  Id.  The 
petitioner claimed that the huge cost it would take to defend the suit in the New York 
District Court was of no benefit to the respondent and that the respondent actually filed the 
case in New York to haggle and vex the petitioner.  Id. at 51–52.  The Supreme Court found 
that the supremacy clause prevented the Ohio state court from enjoining Kepner’s action 
because it was based on a matter of federal law.  Id. at 52.  Hence, the state could not stop 
Kepner’s New York action.  Id.  The doctrine of forum non conveniens was inapplicable 
because the Federal Employers’ Liability Act only allowed Kepner to bring his action in 
New York, where the defendant was an inhabitant.  Id. at 51.  Because forum non conveniens 
would have caused dismissal of Kepner’s claim, Kepner would have had to re-file.  Id.  His 
action essentially would have been barred because the Federal Employer’ Liability Act 
prevented him from bringing a new Ohio action.  Id. at 50–53.  Therefore, this complex 
situation demonstrated the need for a transfer provision rather than forum non conveniens.  
Id.; see also Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 505; Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. at 58. 
49 See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. at 48, for an example of a defendant 
being forced to defend in an inconvenient forum: 
It was stated the federal court chosen was seven hundred miles from 
the residence of the respondent and numerous witnesses; that to 
present the case properly required the personal attendance of 
approximately twenty-five locally available witnesses . . . at a cost 
estimated to exceed the cost of the presentation of the case . . . with no 
resulting benefit to the injured employee. 
Id.  However, due to the lack of a venue transfer provision, the defendant in Baltimore & 
Ohio R.R. was forced to defend in such a forum.  Id. at 52–53. 
50 See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955).  The Supreme Court indicated that 
Congress did more than simply codify forum non conveniens.  Id. at 32.  The Court indicated 
that § 1404(a)  replaced the harshest result of forum non conveniens, dismissal, with transfer.  
Id.; see, e.g., All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (3d Cir. 1952) 
(indicating that forum non conveniens is much different from § 1404(a) because forum non 
conveniens finds the action to be so inappropriate and inconvenient that it is best to stop the 
litigation and let it begin elsewhere). 
51 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000); see also Ex parte Collette, 337 U.S. at 57.  The Supreme 
Court specifically quoted the reviser’s notes that went along with § 1404(a): 
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2. Section 1404(a) 
One law Congress passed was § 1404(a).52  Section 1404(a) accounts 
for defendants, preserves legitimate plaintiff claims, and promotes 
efficiency.53  Section 1404(a) operates like forum non conveniens because it 
allows for a venue change if the original forum is unreasonable, and it 
presupposes that two legitimate forums exist where both personal 
jurisdiction and venue are proper.54  Further, the Supreme Court has 
                                                                                                             
Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even 
though the venue is proper.  As an example of the need of such a 
provision, see Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. . . . .  The new subsection requires 
the court to determine that the transfer is necessary for convenience of 
the parties and witnesses, and further, that it is in the interest of justice 
to do so. 
Ex parte Collette, 337 U.S. at 58. 
To relieve against what was apparently thought to be the harshness of 
dismissal, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, of an action 
brought in an inconvenient one of two or more legally available 
forums, . . . and concerned by the reach of Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. 
Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, . . . Congress, in 1948, enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335–36 (1960). 
52 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).  “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it 
might have been brought.”  Id.  The remainder of § 1404, which is not within the scope of 
this Note, is as follows: 
(b) Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any action, suit 
or proceeding of a civil nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may 
be transferred, in the discretion of the court, from the division in which 
pending to any other division in the same district.  Transfer of 
proceedings in rem brought by or on behalf of the United States may 
be transferred under this section without the consent of the United 
States where all other parties request transfer. 
(c) A district court may order any civil action to be tried at any place 
within the division in which it is pending. 
(d) As used in this section, the term “district court” includes the 
District of Guam, the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, 
and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the term “district” 
includes the territorial jurisdiction of each such court. 
Id. § 1404(b)–(d). 
53 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 111.11. 
Recognizing that the “broad venue provisions in federal Acts often 
resulted in inconvenient forums,” Congress intended Section 1404(a) to 
remedy this situation by authorizing easy transfer of actions to a more 
convenient federal forum.  It has a broad remedial purpose:  “to 
prevent the waste ‘of time, energy and money’ and ‘to protect 
litigants.’” 
Id. 
54 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (stating forum non conveniens presumes two 
permissible forums); see also Hoffman, 363 U.S. 335.  The Supreme Court determined that the 
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determined that § 1404(a) applies to all federal civil actions.55  As a result, 
§ 1404(a) even applies to those actions where forum non conveniens could 
not be used, and thus, it solves the problems of forum non conveniens 
because it applies uniformly to all federal actions. 56   However, the 
biggest improvement over forum non conveniens is that § 1404(a) does not 
dismiss a case like forum non conveniens.57  Instead, it simply transfers the 
case to a new court, which preserves valid plaintiff claims because the 
case does not have to be re-filed.58  Thus, § 1404(a) is a more efficient 
codification of forum non conveniens because it applies uniformly and 
does not result in dismissal.59   
                                                                                                             
“might have been brought” language in § 1404(a) meant that the case could only be 
transferred to a forum where the plaintiff could have brought the action at the time that he 
filed suit.  Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 344.  The dispute originated because the defendant wanted 
to transfer the action to a district court in Illinois from the district court in Texas.  Id. at 336.  
Even though the court was an improper venue and lacked jurisdiction in that forum, the 
trial court granted the motion to transfer “for the convenience of the parties and witnesses 
in the interest of justice” because the defendant had waived both the personal jurisdiction 
and venue requirement by requesting the transfer.  Id. at 337.  Restricting § 1404(a) to its 
precise language, the Supreme Court ruled that the transfer was not proper because the 
action could not originally have been brought in the Illinois district court, even though the 
defendant waived his right to challenge venue and personal jurisdiction after the fact.  Id. at 
343. 
55 Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. at 58.  The Supreme Court interpreted the words “civil action” 
to mean all civil actions.  Id.  “The reviser’s notes make clear that the phrase was 
substituted for ‘suit,’ formerly used in various venue statutes, in the light of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure, rule 2, 28 U.S.C.A:  There shall be one form of action to be known as ‘civil 
action.’”  Id. at 58 n.6. 
56 Id. at 59.  This interpretation resolved the problem forum non conveniens encountered in 
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., in that § 1404(a) did not apply to only some federal laws like forum 
non conveniens, but rather, it applied to all federal laws.  See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the 
problems with forum non conveniens).  The Supreme Court has also asserted that the 
relevant factors a court was to look at under forum non conveniens for the plaintiff’s choice 
of forum were not to be considered.  Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955).  The 
Court indicated that a transfer could take place under § 1404(a) with a lesser showing of 
inconvenience than forum non conveniens.  Id.; cf. Rogers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 219 F. 
Supp. 598, 600 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (denying the plaintiff’s contention that a transfer under 
§ 1404(a) required a clear and compelling reason for transfer because § 1404(a) was a 
revision of forum non conveniens and required only a lesser showing of convenience). 
57 See Norwood, 349 U.S. at 32; All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (3d 
Cir. 1952).  The Supreme Court indicated that § 1404(a) was not meant to be a mere 
codification of forum non conveniens; rather, it was meant to be a revision.  Norwood, 349 U.S. 
at 32.  As proof, the Court looked to the fact that the harshest part of the doctrine, 
dismissal, was replaced.  Id. 
58 See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text (indicating how the Court interpreted 
that § 1404(a) resolved the problems caused by forum non conveniens:  dismissal and 
inapplicability to all federal statutes). 
59 See supra note 56 and accompanying text (describing § 1404(a) as an improvement 
over forum non conveniens because it allowed an easier transfer). 
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However, § 1404(a) conflicts with the Erie Doctrine 60  because it 
inevitably involves two different state forums with different state laws.61  
                                                 
60 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law in Federal 
Courts:  A Reevaluation, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 21 (Fall 1998–1999).  Erie overturned the earlier 
Supreme Court decision of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), which allowed a federal court to 
ignore a state’s common law and apply its own independent judgment of what the law 
should be.  304 U.S. at 90.  Erie stated, among other things, that this interpretation was 
improper because it prevented uniformity of the law throughout the state even though it 
attempted to promote uniformity in the federal court system.  Id. at 91.  Therefore, Erie 
determined that federal courts had to utilize state common law from the state in which it 
was located in diversity cases.  Id. 
 In developing the Erie doctrine, the Supreme Court has focused on distinguishing 
between substance and procedure.  See Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); 
17A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 124.01 (3d ed. 2004) 
[hereinafter  17A MOORE ET AL.].  In Guaranty Trust Co., the Court noted that the difference 
between substance and procedure depends on the context in which the question arises 
because a rule of law may be procedural for one purpose and substantive for another. 326 
U.S. at 108–12.  Thus, Guaranty Trust Co. defined substantive as something that would 
“significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard [the law].”  Id. 
at 109.  This principle became known as the “outcome determinative” test.  Id. 
 This standard was developed more in later cases.  See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 
(1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).  In Byrd, the Court 
developed a test for balancing competing state and federal laws by using outcome as only 
one factor.  See 17A MOORE ET AL., supra, § 124.06.  The Byrd analysis recognizes three 
elements:  “(1) the state’s interest in having federal courts recognize and uphold its 
substantive rules and policies, (2) the federal court’s interests in adhering to significant 
federal principles in the administration of justice, and (3) the litigants’ interests in having 
[a] uniform outcomes regardless of where the plaintiff sues.”  Id.  Although it is difficult to 
apply, the Byrd test is still applicable in cases that do not involve federal rules.  See 
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 516 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 Hanna provided federal courts with a guide to determine whether to apply the state or 
federal law under the Rules Enabling Act, which “provides that the Supreme Court has 
power to prescribe, by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, 
and the practice and procedure of the United States district courts in civil actions.” See 17A 
MOORE ET AL., supra, § 124.04.  The Hanna test requires courts to ask whether “1) the scope 
of the rule is ‘sufficiently broad to cover the situation’; and 2) the rule is (a) constitutional 
and (b) a valid exercise of the Supreme Court’s rule-making power under the federal Rules 
Enabling Act.”  Id. § 124.02.  If the scope of the federal rule is too broad for the Rules 
Enabling Act to apply, the court must look to other standards that the Supreme Court has 
developed, such as the Byrd test.  Id. 
 The Supreme Court determined later which law to apply between states in a given 
case.  See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).  Choice of law is defined 
as “the question of which jurisdiction’s law should apply in a given case.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 258 (8th ed. 2004).  After Erie, Klaxon determined that a federal court must 
apply the choice of law rules of the state in which the federal court is located in diversity 
suits rather than applying the state law where most of the incident at issue took place.  
Fruehwald, supra, at 26.  The rationale behind this decision was to promote uniformity 
within a state; otherwise diversity of citizenship would result in different laws being 
applied between a federal court and a state court that were located in close proximity to 
each other.  Id.   
61 See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). 
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The Court determined how the Erie doctrine applies with § 1404(a) in 
Van Dusen v. Barrack.62  In Van Dusen, the Supreme Court held that when 
a defendant moves for change of venue under § 1404(a), the state law of 
the court where the action was brought, the transferor court, applies. 63  
The Court later found, in Ferens v. John Deere Co.,64 that even if a plaintiff 
initiates the transfer, the state law of the transferor court applies.65  In 
sum, § 1404(a) applies when venue is initially proper in any civil action, 
                                                                                                             
[I]n our opinion the underlying and fundamental question is whether 
. . . a change of venue within the federal system is to be accompanied 
by a change in the applicable state law.  Whenever the law of the 
transferee State significantly differs from that of the transferor state . . . 
it becomes necessary to consider what bearing a change of venue, if 
accompanied by a change in state law, would have on “the interest of 
justice.” 
Id. at 625–26. 
62 Id. at 636–37. In Van Dusen, the respondents were representatives of approximately 
forty Pennsylvania decedents who instituted an action for wrongful deaths in a 
Pennsylvania district court based on a plane crash in Boston, Massachusetts.  Id. at 613–14.  
More than one hundred total actions had been instituted against the array of defendants 
including the airline, various manufacturers, the United States, and even the Massachusetts 
Port Authority.  Id.  The petitioners moved to transfer the Pennsylvania action to a district 
court in Massachusetts under § 1404(a).  Id. at 614.  The Pennsylvania district court granted 
the transfer and determined that the law of Pennsylvania would apply in the 
Massachusetts district court.  Id.  The respondents then sought a writ of mandamus from 
the court of appeals and successfully contended that the district court erred in allowing the 
transfer.  Id.  The court of appeals found that the § 1404(a) transfer could only be granted if 
the respondents had been able to sue in Massachusetts at the time the suit was brought.  Id.  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Id. at 615. 
63 Id. at 639. 
We believe, therefore, that both the history and purposes of § 1404(a) 
indicate that it should be regarded as a federal judicial housekeeping 
measure, dealing with the placement of litigation in the federal courts 
and generally intended, on the basis of convenience and fairness, 
simply to authorize a change of courtrooms. . . .  We conclude, 
therefore, . . . where the defendants seek transfer, the transferee district 
court must be obligated to apply the state law that would have been 
applied if there had been no change of venue.  A change of venue under 
§ 1404(a) generally should be, with respect to state law, but a change of 
courtrooms. 
Id. at 636–37, 639 (emphasis added). 
64 494 U.S. 516 (1990). 
65 Id.  The Supreme Court determined that the transferor court law should apply 
pursuant to a plaintiff initiated transfer under § 1404(a).  Id.  Therefore, sound reason 
suggests decisions such as that in United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1964), 
would be compelled to apply the transferor law as outlined from Ferens in transfers where 
a court lacks personal jurisdiction and transfers under § 1404(a).  See infra Part II.B 
(discussing the problem with choice of law following transfers where a court lacked 
jurisdiction). 
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and a court is to utilize the state law of the transferor court following the 
transfer.66   
Despite the improvement that § 1404(a) provided over forum non 
conveniens, it was not the only law that Congress passed.67  The other 
venue transfer provision, § 1406(a), is more enigmatic, but Congress 
apparently enacted it to improve efficiency of venue transfer as well. 68 
3. Section 1406(a) 
Unlike both § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens, which are used 
generally when venue is proper, § 1406(a)69 allows transfers to a proper 
federal forum from a court where venue is initially improper.70  Under 
§ 1406(a), the transfer must be to a court where the action could have 
been brought, which requires both proper jurisdiction and proper 
venue.71  It also requires a law other than § 1404(a) to apply after a 
                                                 
66 See supra Part II.A.2 (providing that § 1404(a) has commonly been accepted to work). 
67 See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).  Section 1406(a) allows a transfer of venue when it is initially 
found to be improper, as long as it is “in the interest of justice.”  28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 
68 See infra Part II.A.3 (indicating that the lack of legislative history and apparent 
codification of forum non conveniens in § 1404(a) suggest that § 1406(a) did not have a 
purpose). 
69 “The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong 
division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any 
district or division in which it could have been brought.”  28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2000).  The 
remainder of § 1406, which is not within the scope of this Note follows: 
(b) Nothing in this chapter [28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1391 et seq.] shall impair the 
jurisdiction of a district court of any matter involving a party who does 
not interpose timely and sufficient objection to the venue. 
(c) As used in this section, the term “district court” includes the 
District Court of Guam, the District Court for the Northern Mariana 
Islands, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the term 
“district” includes the territorial jurisdiction of each such court. 
Id. § 1406(b)–(c). 
70 See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 634; see also Nelson v. Int’l Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9th 
Cir. 1983); Woodward Park Imaging, Inc. v. Iwamoto, 955 F. Supp. 1006, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 
1997); Skilling v. Funk Aircraft Co., 173 F. Supp. 939, 941–42 (W.D. Mo. 1959); cf. Clayton v. 
Swift & Co., 132 F. Supp. 154, 158 (D. Va. 1955) (holding that a transfer could be made 
under § 1406(a) if it was doubtful venue was proper without actually determining if it was 
improper).  See generally Schiller v. Mit-Clip Co., 180 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1950) (indicating that 
a transfer under § 1406(a) does not depend upon the inconvenience of trying the action 
where it was brought but simply that venue was improper). 
71 See Orion Shipping & Trading Co. v. United States, 247 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1957) 
(remanding the case but suggesting that it be transferred to a district with proper venue); 
French Transit v. Modern Coupon Sys., 858 F. Supp. 22, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that a 
case should be transferred to a district where it could have been brought); Zumft v. Doney 
Slate Co., 698 F. Supp. 444, 446–47 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (determining that a case would be 
transferred to a venue that was proper and had jurisdiction over the defendants). 
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transfer.72   Van Dusen did not address what state law should apply 
following a § 1406(a) transfer, but most courts have stated that a court 
should apply the state law of the state to which the case is transferred, or 
the transferee law, instead of the state law of the transferor court.73  If the 
state law of the transferor court followed a plaintiff from the transferor 
forum to the transferee forum, the result would be the epitome of forum 
shopping because the action was not technically allowed to be in the 
transferor court in the first place.74   Such a result would encourage 
plaintiffs to file claims in any state that had beneficial law, regardless of 
whether venue was proper, simply to capture that state law after the 
transfer.75  Hence, most courts have settled on applying the law of the 
transferee court to avoid this result.76  Therefore, § 1406(a) applies when 
venue is improper and the transferee court should apply the state law of 
the state in which it sits.77   
Besides the function of § 1406(a), however, the purpose of § 1406(a) 
is not entirely clear.78  Prior to the enactment of § 1406(a), only dismissal 
                                                 
72 See Ellis v. Great Sw. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1109–10 (5th Cir. 1981); Martin v. Stokes, 
623 F.2d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 1980). 
73 See Ellis, 646 F.2d at 1109–10; Martin, 623 F.2d at 473; Tillman v. Eattock, 385 F. Supp. 
625, 627 (D. Kan. 1974).  Compare Bealle v. Nyden’s, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 86, 88–89 (D. Conn. 
1965) (transferring a case to district court where the state statute of limitations had run and 
allowing the state law to apply resulting in the case’s dismissal), with Viaggio v. Field, 177 
F. Supp. 643, 648 (D. Md. 1959) (disallowing a transfer because the state statute of 
limitations of the transferee court had run and rendering it a waste of time to transfer 
simply to dismiss the action). But see Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1966) 
(applying the transferor court law following a § 1406(a) transfer). 
74 Ellis, 646 F.2d at 1109.  There are three main types of forum shopping:  shopping for 
location, law of the case shopping, and shopping for choice of law.  Stowell R.R. Kelner, 
Note, “Adrift on an Uncharted Sea,” A Survey of Section 1404(a) Transfer in the Federal System, 
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 634 (1992).  Courts have primarily been concerned with the third type 
of forum shopping, or trying to capture favorable law with § 1406(a), because it would be 
unfair for the defendant to be subject to the state law where adjudication could not take 
place.  See Nelson, 716 F.2d at 643; Ellis, 646 F.2d at 1110–11; Parahm v. Edwards, 346 F. 
Supp. 968, 973 (D. Ga. 1972). 
75 See Nelson, 716 F.2d at 643; Ellis, 646 F.2d at 1110–11; Parahm, 346 F. Supp. at 973; see 
also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).  The word “may” was purposely put into the statute to allow 
discretion to consider whether plaintiffs were forum shopping and determine to either 
dismiss the case or transfer it.  Skilling, 173 F. Supp. at 942. 
76 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (displaying support for courts that have 
determined the law of the transferee state should apply after a § 1406(a) transfer). 
77 See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text (explaining the function of § 1406(a)). 
78 Finzi, supra note 6, at 979 n.22.  Mr. Finzi expresses that the primary reason that the 
purpose of § 1406(a) is unknown is mainly because the legislative history of § 1406(a) does 
not state a purpose for the statute.  Id.  Instead, most of the purpose for § 1406(a), including 
its extensive protection of plaintiffs, stems from case law.  Id. at 984. 
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was available when venue was improper. 79   Apparently, Congress 
passed § 1406(a) to alleviate these rare instances because dismissal was 
harsh and sometimes caused unjust results.80  Some courts have stated 
that the purpose of § 1406(a) is to remove any obstacles, such as judicial 
technicalities and time constraints, that obstruct efficient adjudication.81  
In Goldlawr v. Heiman, 82  the Supreme Court utilized similar analysis 
when it determined that a case could be transferred under § 1406(a) 
when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.83  The 
Goldlawr decision was the first major case that defined the purpose of 
§ 1406(a), but it had direct ramifications upon the function of not only 
§ 1406(a) but also upon § 1404(a).84 
B. Venue Transfer When a Court Lacks Jurisdiction 
Sections 1404(a) and 1406(a) had distinct applications and were 
passed to make specific instances of courtroom change easier and more 
                                                 
79 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 111.31.  “Prior to the enactment of Section 1406(a), if 
the plaintiff lay venue in the wrong district, the district court’s sole option was to dismiss 
the action.  Although the dismissal was without prejudice, it . . . often had the harsh result 
of divesting the plaintiff of his . . . cause of action.”  Id. 
80 Id. § 111.02. 
Prior to the enactment of Section 1406(a), if the plaintiff filed an action 
in an improper venue, the defendant could make a motion to dismiss 
for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3).  The only option available to 
the district court, if the defendant’s argument proved correct, was to 
dismiss the claims against the defendant.  Unless the dismissed 
defendant was a party who had to be joined under Rule 19(b), if the 
plaintiff had filed claims against other defendants, the action would 
continue on as to those defendants and the plaintiff would be forced to 
file another action against the dismissed defendant.  This obviously 
inefficient result is cured by Section 1406(a). 
Id. 
81 See Aguacate Consol. Mines, Inc. v. Deeprock, Inc., 566 F.2d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(stating that the purpose of § 1406 is “to remove obstacles that impede expeditious and 
orderly adjudication”); see also Fuente v. ICC, 451 F. Supp. 867, 872 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (stating 
that § 1406(a) “was designed to avoid the ‘time consuming and justice defeating 
technicalities’ to which dismissal for improper venue necessarily gives rise”). 
82 369 U.S. 463 (1962). 
83 See infra Part II.B.1 (explaining how Goldlawr defined the purpose of § 1406(a) and 
expanding its use to trump personal jurisdiction); see also Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 
(1962); Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967); Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 
813 (5th Cir. 1967). 
84 See infra Parts II.B, III (explaining how courts split in the application of Goldlawr to 
§ 1404(a) and how this had direct ramifications on which choice of law to apply and 
ultimately led courts to use § 1631). 
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efficient.85  However, when courts used the statutes to transfer a case 
when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, 86  the 
distinction between the two began to dissipate. 87  Goldlawr determined 
that the purpose of venue transfer was to remove all obstacles that kept a 
court from adjudicating a claim, and consequently, the Goldlawr court 
determined that when both venue was improper and a court lacked 
                                                 
85 See supra Parts II.A.2–3 (discussing that § 1404(a) is meant for transfers to a 
permissible forum from a permissible forum and that § 1406(a) is meant for transfers to a 
permissible forum from an impermissible forum). 
86 Initially, although the Supreme Court has never spoke on the matter, lower courts 
found that without subject matter jurisdiction, a court could not transfer a case.  See 
Grubisic v. Esperdy, 229 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).  One federal court stated that a lack 
of subject matter renders the court powerless to grant any relief and that no statutory 
authority could be exercised without such jurisdiction.  Id. at 680.  However, this finding 
was differentiated from instances, like Goldlawr, where a court lacked personal jurisdiction.  
369 U.S. at 463. 
87 Personal jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to bring an individual within its 
adjudicative process.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 384 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).  The idea was 
first exemplified in the landmark Supreme Court case Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1887).  
Personal jurisdiction was further elaborated in later cases and involves a complex process 
in itself.  See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Hanson v. 
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  However, 
the underlying principle is that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
limits the power of a state court to render personal judgments valid against a defendant 
when the court lacks personal jurisdiction.  See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. 
at 294 (“[T]he Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may 
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.”); Hanson, 357 
U.S. at 250 (holding that a state is forbidden to enter judgment attempting to bind a person 
over whom it has no jurisdiction); Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319 (“Whether due process is 
satisfied . . . [d]oes not contemplate that a state may make a binding judgment in personam 
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts.”).  
Pennoyer laid the groundwork for the concept of personal jurisdiction.  95 U.S. at 732.  In 
Pennoyer, the Court held that the validity of court judgments could be questioned and 
resisted and does not constitute due process of law when a court lacks jurisdiction.  Id. at 
732–33. 
Whatever difficulty may be experienced in giving to those terms a 
definition which will embrace every permissible exertion of power 
affecting private rights, and exclude such as is forbidden, there can be 
no doubt of their meaning when applied to judicial proceedings.  They 
then mean a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and 
principles which have been established in our systems of 
jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights. 
Id. at 733.  Other courts would build upon this ideal.  For instance, in World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp., the Court reiterated that judgments rendered in violation of due process 
were void and not entitled to full faith and credit.  444 U.S. at 291.  Further, due process 
does not allow a state to make a binding judgment against individuals when that state 
lacks personal jurisdiction over them.  Id. at 294.  Thus, the common idea has stood strong 
through the years that a court may not render judgments over a person when that court 
lacks personal jurisdiction and should dismiss the case.  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 
U.S. 286; Hanson, 357 U.S. 235; Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. 310. 
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personal jurisdiction over the defendant, § 1406(a) was broad enough to 
allow the transfer.88  However, when the circuit courts attempted to 
apply this rule to instances where a court was a proper venue but lacked 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the courts split on whether to 
utilize § 1404(a) or § 1406(a). 89   This split, in turn, was immensely 
significant because whether a court used § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) affected 
which choice of law would apply following the transfer.90  As a result, 
many interpretations emerged as to what choice of law to apply, courts 
expended unneeded time and resources in making such interpretations, 
and uncertainty existed regarding the exact function of both § 1404(a) 
and § 1406(a).91  One court aptly labeled the problem as “a merry chase 
through the murky area in which the Erie doctrine and the federal 
change of venue statutes intersect.”92  Goldlawr was the beginning.93 
1. The Beginning of Venue Transfer Without Jurisdiction 
In Goldlawr, the United States Supreme Court used language that 
suggested courts should strongly attempt to preserve a plaintiff’s claim 
with a venue transfer due to a court’s lack of personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant.94  The main issue in Goldlawr was whether to transfer or 
                                                 
88 See 369 U.S. at 466–67 (“The section is thus in accord with the general purpose which 
has prompted many of the procedural changes of the past few years—that of removing 
whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases and 
controversies on their merits.”). 
89 See infra Part II.B.2 (showing the difficulty courts had in transferring venue when 
venue was proper but the court lacked jurisdiction, which resulted in a circuit split in 
whether to use § 1404(a) or § 1406(a)). 
90 See infra Parts II.A.2–3 (explaining how courts are supposed to apply the state law of 
the transferor court with § 1404(a) and the state law of the transferee court with § 1406(a)). 
91 The first rule of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure suggests that uniformity and 
efficiency should be a strong consideration in procedure with federal courts:  “These rules 
govern the procedure in the United States district courts . . . they shall be construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”  
FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also Michael D. Bayles, On Legal Reform:  Legal Stability and Legislative 
Questions, 65 KY. L.J. 631, 637 (1977).  “Five important considerations support the principle 
of stability:  The need for certainty; fairness to those who have relied upon the extant rule; the 
efficiency of following precedent; the need for continuity in the law; and equality in treating 
similar cases similarly.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
92 Ellis v. Great Sw. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1100–01 (5th Cir. 1981). 
93 See infra Part II.B.1 (showing how Goldlawr provided analysis that would be used by 
courts later to split on whether to transfer under § 1404(a) when venue was proper but a 
court lacked personal jurisdiction).  
94 Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962).  The Court stated: 
The problem which gave rise to the enactment of the section was that 
of avoiding the injustice which had often resulted to plaintiffs from 
dismissal of their actions merely because they had made an erroneous 
guess with regard to the existence of some elusive fact of the kind 
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dismiss an action when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant and when a court was also an improper venue.95  The Goldlawr 
Court held that a federal district court could transfer a case under 
§ 1406(a) if venue was improper, even if that court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.96  According to the Court, § 1406(a) was 
amply broad to allow transfers when a court lacked personal 
jurisdiction, so long as it was “in the interests of justice.”97  The Goldlawr 
Court was particularly concerned with the injustice that would occur if 
plaintiffs’ actions were dismissed simply because they had made a 
mistake with venue or personal jurisdiction, and it further stated:  “The 
section is thus in accord with the general purpose . . . that of removing 
whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication 
of cases and controversies on their merits.”98  Goldlawr did not determine 
                                                                                                             
upon which venue provisions often turn.  Indeed, this case is itself a 
typical example of the problem sought to be avoided, for dismissal 
here would have resulted in plaintiff’s losing a substantial part of its 
cause of action under the statute of limitations merely because it made 
a mistake in thinking that the respondent corporations could be 
“found” or that they “transact . . . business” in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. . . .  The language of § 1406 (a) is amply broad enough to 
authorize the transfer of cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have 
been in filing his case as to venue, whether the court in which it was 
filed had personal jurisdiction over the defendants or not.  The section 
is thus in accord with the general purpose which has prompted many 
of the procedural changes of the past few years—that of removing 
whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious and orderly 
adjudication of cases and controversies on their merits. 
Id. at 466–67. 
95 Id. at 464.  The case originally was filed in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on an antitrust action in accordance with the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts.  Id.  The district court found that venue was improper as to two 
of the defendants and that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction, and it then 
transferred the action to the Southern District of New York pursuant to § 1406(a), which is 
a court that had both personal jurisdiction over the two defendants in question and was a 
proper venue.  Id.  The defendants then appeared in the New York district court and 
motioned to dismiss the case under the theory that the original district court in 
Pennsylvania lacked personal jurisdiction over them and thus lacked the power to transfer 
the case.  Id. at 464–65.  The New York court granted this motion, the Second Circuit 
affirmed, and the case then went to the Supreme Court.  Id. at 465. 
96 Id. at 466 (finding the language of § 1406(a) amply broad to allow such a transfer). 
97 Id. at 465 (“Nothing in that language indicates that the operation of the section was 
intended to be limited to actions in which the transferring court has personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant.”). 
98 Id. at 466.  This language would become the root of the problem.  See infra Part III.A.  
Also, it was the language relied upon by countless other courts in allowing venue transfer 
in factually different circumstances from Goldlawr.  See Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 
(8th Cir. 1967); Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. 
Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1964). 
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whether the same analysis would apply when venue was proper, but 
other federal courts wrestled with this question as time passed.99 
2. Venue Transfer Without Jurisdiction but Proper Venue 
Goldlawr did not answer whether § 1404(a) could be used when the 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.100  Some courts 
found the Goldawr analysis applied to § 1404(a) because it was the 
companion section to § 1406(a).101  Other courts held that only § 1406(a) 
applied when a court lacked jurisdiction because venue was technically 
improper when a court lacked personal jurisdiction.102  One court did not 
even specify if § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) applied, but it transferred the case 
anyway.103  However, every court relied heavily on the language from 
                                                 
99 See Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 468 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
And it is incongruous to consider, as the Court’s holding would seem 
to imply, that in the ‘interest of justice’ Congress sought in § 1406(a) to 
deal with the transfer of cases where both venue and jurisdiction are 
lacking in the district where the action is commenced, while neglecting 
to provide any comparable alleviative measures for the plaintiff who 
selects a district where venue is proper but where personal jurisdiction 
cannot be obtained. 
Id. 
100 See Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1980); Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song, 572 F.2d 
77 (2d Cir. 1978); Mayo Clinic, 383 F.2d at 655–56; Dubin, 380 F.2d at 815–16; Berkowitz, 328 
F.2d at 361. 
101 See Berkowitz, 328 F.2d at 361 (transferring under § 1404(a) when venue was proper 
but the court lacked personal jurisdiction because it was the companion section of § 1406(a) 
and should function equivalently). 
102 All of these courts indicated that a transfer was to be made under § 1406(a) when 
venue was proper but jurisdiction was lacking because the lack of jurisdiction made venue 
technically improper.  See Martin, 623 F.2d 469; Mayo Clinic, 383 F.2d 653; Dubin, 380 F.2d 
813. 
103 See Corke, 572 F.2d 77 (not specifying whether the transfer was utilized under § 1404(a) 
or § 1406(a) when venue was proper but the court lacked personal jurisdiction). 
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Goldlawr.104  United States v. Berkowitz105 was the first federal appellate 
case to encounter this problem.106 
In Berkowitz, the Third Circuit held that a court could transfer under 
§ 1404(a) when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.107  
The Berkowitz court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, but 
venue was proper.108  The Berkowitz court determined that the analysis 
from Goldlawr should apply to both § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) because they 
were companion sections. 109   Relying heavily on the language from 
Goldlawr, the Berkowitz court indicated that § 1406(a) was amply broad to 
preserve a plaintiff’s claim by removing any obstacles that impede an 
                                                 
104 See supra Part II.B.1; supra note 94 (providing the Goldlawr language that courts relied 
upon). 
105 328 F.2d at 361.  The case arose when the United States filed a tax evasion claim 
against Morton Berkowitz in a district court in Pennsylvania.  Id. at 359.  Berkowitz was the 
officer that was responsible for the delinquent payments of a large corporation.  Id.  The 
suit was filed just seventeen days before the applicable statute of limitations would expire.  
Id.  Berkowitz then moved to dismiss because he was a citizen of New York and had not 
been properly served.  Id.  The government moved for transfer pursuant to § 1404(a).  Id.  
The district court did not grant transfer under § 1404(a), and the government filed another 
motion to transfer pursuant to § 1406(a).  Id.  However, the district court also denied that 
motion and the government appealed.  Id. at 360. 
106 See 328 F.2d at 361. 
107 Id.  The Berkowitz court found that a court reserved discretion in considering whether 
the action should be transferred pursuant to § 1404(a) because § 1404(a) still retained the 
words “in the interests of justice,” which inherently granted the court discretion on 
whether to transfer a claim, even when venue was proper.  Id.  A district court decision 
presents the rationale for applying § 1404(a) when a court lacks jurisdiction.  See Selsby v. 
Vecchione, 216 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).  In Selsby v. Vecchione, the court specifically 
found that § 1406(a) could not be used when venue was proper.  Id.  The plaintiff in Selsby 
tried to move for a change of venue pursuant to § 1406(a) using the Goldlawr analysis.  Id.  
However, the court limited Goldlawr specifically to situations where venue was initially 
wrong, and in Selsby venue was proper and therefore Goldlawr did not apply.  Id.  This 
decision seemed to suggest that transfer without personal jurisdiction was limited to 
instances only when venue was improper.  Id. 
108 328 F.2d at 360.  The district court determined that tax liability arose in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, and the tax returns were filed there; hence, venue was technically 
proper and § 1406(a) could not be used because the language indicated that it should be 
used when venue was improper.  Id. at 359; see also supra Part II.A.3 (indicating general 
support that § 1406(a) only applies when venue is initially improper).  Further, personal 
jurisdiction was improper because Berkowitz was a citizen of New York and service of 
process was not properly obtained.  Berkowitz, 328 F.2d at 360. 
109 Berkowitz, 328 F.2d at 361. 
It is true that Goldlawr involved an interpretation of § 1406(a).  
Nevertheless, we think that its rationale applies equally to § 1404(a), 
for these are companion sections, remedial in nature, enacted at the 
same time, and both dealing with the expeditious transfer of an action 
from one district or division to another. 
Id. 
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expeditious trial.110  Therefore, because § 1406(a) was amply broad to 
allow transfers when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant, its companion section, § 1404(a), was also amply broad to 
allow a court to transfer a case when it lacked personal jurisdiction even 
though venue was proper.111  Despite the Third Circuit’s holding, other 
courts did not find that § 1404(a) was applicable in instances where a 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant when venue was 
proper.112  
The Eighth Circuit encountered the exact same situation as the Third 
Circuit did in the Berkowitz case, but it concluded that § 1406(a) applied 
even when venue was proper if a court lacked personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant.113  In Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser,114 the Eighth Circuit found the 
common problem when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant was that the case could not proceed to trial on its merits, 
regardless of whether venue was proper.115  The Mayo Clinic court found 
                                                 
110 Id. 
The language of § 1406(a) is amply broad enough to authorize the 
transfer of cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing 
his case as to venue, whether the court in which it was filed had 
personal jurisdiction over the defendants or not.  The section is thus in 
accord with the general purpose which has prompted many of the 
procedural changes of the past few years–that of removing whatever 
obstacles may impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases 
and controversies on their merits. 
Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466–67 (1962). 
111 Berkowitz, 328 F.2d at 361.  “We find it unnecessary to consider the Government’s 
novel and intricate contention that venue may be properly laid in a district and, yet, the 
case may be one  ‘laying venue in the wrong district’ under § 1406(a), for . . . § 1404(a) 
clearly authorizes the transfer of this civil action.”  Id. 
112 See Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1980); Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song, 572 F.2d 
77 (2d Cir. 1978); Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967); Dubin v. United States, 
380 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1967). 
113 See Mayo Clinic, 383 F.2d 653.  Edward Kaiser brought a medical malpractice suit in an 
Illinois federal district court against Mayo Clinic, an association of individuals, and three 
doctors of the Mayo Clinic.  Id. at 653.  All defendants were residents of Minnesota and 
they moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  Id.  Kaiser moved to transfer the case 
instead.  Id.  The district court found that the action was transferable under either § 1404(a) 
or § 1406(a).  Id.  The Eighth Circuit found that only § 1406(a) could be used for a proper 
transfer when a court lacked jurisdiction.  Id. 
114 383 F.2d 653. 
115 Id. at 655–56. 
Certainly a party who has been totally wrong in selecting the forum 
would have no greater right of transfer under § 1406(a) than a party 
who has selected a forum which is wrong only because service of 
process cannot be obtained.  In either event, the case could not proceed 
to trial on its merits. 
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that § 1406(a) was amply broad to remedy either situation.116  Ironically, 
it relied on the exact same language from the Goldlawr case that the Third 
Circuit relied on in Berkowitz. 117   The Sixth Circuit followed similar 
reasoning when it found that a court could transfer pursuant to § 1406(a) 
when it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.118   
In Martin v. Stokes,119 the Sixth Circuit considered the analysis from 
the Berkowitz case but found that § 1404(a) was simply a codification of 
forum non conveniens, and thus, § 1404(a), like forum non conveniens, 
presumed the existence of two permissible forums.120  Section 1404(a) 
                                                                                                             
Id.  The Mayo Clinic court followed the rationale set out in an earlier decision.  Id. at 655; see 
also Dubin, 380 F.2d at 814–16.  Dubin was a tax case in which the defendant appealed a 
previous judgment found against him.  380 F.2d at 814.  Tax liability accrued and returns 
were filed in Ohio, and so the government sued Dubin on the belief that he was a resident 
of Ohio, specifically in the Northern District of Ohio.  Id.  However, the Ohio court could 
not obtain personal jurisdiction over the appellant because he had recently moved to 
Florida.  Id.  The government was faced with being barred by the statute of limitations if it 
commenced the action again, so the government moved for transfer under § 1406(a).  Id.  
The Dubin court found that § 1406(a) was couched in terms of “laying venue in the wrong 
division or district.”  Id. at 815.  Therefore, because § 1406(a) used that language instead of 
“wrong venue,” the Dubin court found that “wrong division or district” meant anytime 
there was an obstacle to an expeditious and orderly adjudication on the merits.  Id. at 815–
16.  Thus, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits relied on promoting efficiency in using § 1406(a), 
just as Berkowitz relied on efficiency in promoting the use of § 1404(a).  Id.; Mayo Clinic, 383 
F.2d at 655; see also Miles v. Charles E. Smith Cos., 404 F. Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1975) (stating 
specifically that the presence of venue does not remove a court’s discretionary authority to 
pursue a transfer under § 1406(a) in the interest of justice). 
116 383 F.2d at 655. 
Looking to the language of § 1406, the statute is couched in terms of 
“laying venue in the wrong division or district.”  The statute does not 
refer to “wrong” venue but rather to venue laid in a “wrong division 
or district.”  We conclude that a district is “wrong” within the meaning 
of § 1406 whenever there exists an “obstacle [to] . . . an expeditious and 
orderly adjudication on the merits. 
Id. (quoting the decision in Dubin, 380 F.2d 813). 
117 Id. at 655–56; see supra note 94 and accompanying text (language essentially stating 
however wrong a plaintiff was in filing, a case could always be preserved). 
118 See, e.g., Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 475 (6th Cir. 1980) (determining that § 1406(a) 
was the proper mode of transfer when a court lacked jurisdiction because venue was 
technically wrong); Taylor v. Love, 415 F.2d 1118, 1120 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding that transfer 
would be proper under § 1406(a) when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant because venue was wrong). 
119 623 F.2d 469. 
120 Id. at 473–74.  In Martin, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident in 
Kentucky.  Id. at 470.  The defendant was the mother of a child who struck the plaintiff.  Id.  
After settlement negotiations failed, the plaintiff learned that the applicable statute of 
limitations in Kentucky was one year.  Id.  Therefore, the plaintiff filed a suit in federal 
court based on diversity in the defendant’s home state of Virginia.  Id.  The defendants 
motioned to transfer the case to Kentucky and to quash for improper service.  Id.  The 
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was to be limited to instances when both personal jurisdiction and venue 
were proper because only then was the original court where the action 
was filed a permissible forum.121  Thus, the Martin court found that the 
proper means of transfer was a broad interpretation of § 1406(a) because 
§ 1406(a) was to be applied whenever there was an obstacle to 
expeditious adjudication such as lack of personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant, which was the analysis from Goldlawr.122  Despite all of these 
varying interpretations, the Second Circuit came up with its own 
analysis.123 
In Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song, 124  the Second Circuit did not use 
§ 1404(a) or § 1406(a), but instead utilized a judicial gloss of the statutory 
language of both.125  The Corke court concluded that transfer would be 
proper in any given case so long as it was in the “interest of justice” 
when a court lacked personal jurisdiction.126  The Corke court used this 
reasoning because a court did not need to determine what venue 
                                                                                                             
Virginia district court transferred the case; however, the district court that transferred the 
case did not specify if it was transferred for convenience under § 1404(a) or for legal 
impediment under § 1406(a).  Id.  Following the transfer, defendants filed for a motion to 
dismiss the action, asserting that it was barred by the Kentucky statute of limitations.  Id.  
The Kentucky district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff 
appealed.  Id. at 471. 
121 Id. at 474 n.7 (referring to Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947), where the 
Supreme Court defined the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which “presupposes at least 
two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria 
for choice between them”). 
122 Id. at 474.  The Martin court noted the inconsistencies among the circuits in whether to 
utilize § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) when transferring where personal jurisdiction is unobtainable.  
Id.  However, the court concluded that precedent demanded it apply § 1406(a) broadly.  Id. 
123 See Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song, 572 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1978) (failing to specify whether 
§ 1404(a) or § 1406(a) authorized the transfer when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant but venue was proper). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 80.  The action was originally filed in the federal district court in the Western 
District of New York.  Id. at 78.  Corke sued for personal injuries sustained during a cruise 
on the defendant’s ship based on negligence in maintenance of the vessel and malpractice 
by the ship’s doctor.  Id.  Corke moved for transfer.  Id.  However, the defendants moved 
for dismissal on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction over them, which was 
granted.  Id.  Corke then appealed.  Id. 
126 Id. at 80.  Specifically, the Corke court cited a federal district court decision from the 
Southern District of New York where the judge said a court “has power to transfer the case 
even if there is no personal jurisdiction over the defendants, and whether or not venue is 
proper in [the] district, if a transfer would be in the interest of justice.”  Id. (quoting Volk 
Corp. v. Art-Pak Clip Art Serv., 432 F. Supp. 1179, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)). 
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provision was needed, which was a simpler and more efficient 
approach.127 
In sum, courts were split on whether to transfer a case under 
§ 1404(a) or § 1406(a) when venue was proper but personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant was lacking.128  Courts after Goldlawr, like Berkowitz, 
Mayo Clinic, Martin, and Corke, used different transfer provisions to reach 
the same end.129   The Berkowitz court utilized § 1404(a), while other 
courts, such as Mayo Clinic and Martin, found that only § 1406(a) could 
be used when a court lacked personal jurisdiction.130  However, despite 
the use of different statutes, the end result was the same in Berkowitz, 
Mayo Clinic, Martin, and Corke, in that a case could be transferred when a 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant but was also a 
proper venue.131  Essentially, the Corke court, rather than pretending that 
a distinction between § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) was important,  stated the 
rule then in existence:  When a court lacks jurisdiction the court should 
preserve the plaintiff’s claim in a venue transfer.132  
                                                 
127 Id. at 81.  The court did not specifically say efficiency was the goal for its decision, but 
it did note with regards to the particular facts of the case at hand that “[b]ecause transfer is 
so clearly warranted by the facts at hand, it is unnecessary to waste the district court’s 
valuable time by requiring a hearing on transferability.”  Id.  Thus, efficiency seemed to be 
in the court’s mind when it made its decision.  Id. 
128 See supra Part II.B.2 (exemplifying the circuit split as to whether § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) 
applied when a court transferred a case even though it lacked personal jurisdiction). 
129 See Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1980); Corke, 572 F.2d at 78-79; Mayo Clinic, 
383 F.2d at 655–56; Dubin, 380 F.2d at 815–16; Berkowitz, 328 F.2d at 361; Finzi, supra note 6, 
at 988. 
Goldlawr held that section 1406 could be used to transfer claims 
defective as to both personal jurisdiction and venue.  It did not address 
the applicability of section 1406 to claims defective only as to personal 
jurisdiction.  Courts confronted with claims that met venue 
requirements but fell outside their territorial jurisdiction thus faced a 
dilemma.  They could have remained faithful to the language of 
section 1406 and refused to transfer a claim filed in a proper venue.  
This, however, would have placed the plaintiff who had erred as to 
both personal jurisdiction and venue in a better position than the 
plaintiff who had erred only as to personal jurisdiction.  Unwilling to 
sanction this obvious injustice, courts universally rejected this 
approach.  Instead, courts resorted to various interpretations of both 
transfer provisions to reach the result desired. 
Finzi, supra note 6, at 986. 
130 See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the language, purpose, and application of § 1404(a)). 
131 See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text (indicating that because venue was 
technically improper when a court lacked jurisdiction, the venue was improper). 
132 See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text.  However, even if a court were to 
utilize the Corke approach, finding that it is proper to transfer under either § 1404(a) or 
§ 1406(a), this decision does not solve the enigma of which choice of law follows from a 
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However, this dilemma merely planted the seed for problems in 
venue transfer. 133   Goldlawr and its progeny had determined that 
§ 1404(a) and § 1406(a) functioned equivalently when venue was proper 
but a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.134  The next 
question was which choice of law to apply following a transfer when a 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.135  Because of the 
inherent differences in the choice of law that was supposed to follow 
each of the venue transfer provisions, transferor state law with § 1404(a) 
and transferee state law with § 1406(a), a court’s decision to use either 
§ 1404(a) or § 1406(a) would be significant.136 
3.  Intersection of “Proper Venue but Improper Jurisdiction Transfers” 
and “Choice of Law” 
When Goldlawr analysis intersected with choice of law analysis, 
courts were unsure of whether to follow choice of law standards for 
§ 1404(a) and § 1406(a) or to circumvent choice of law rules because 
following the established standards would be unfair to either defendants 
or plaintiffs. 137   Some courts deviated from established principles of 
choice of law with § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) and some courts did not.138  
                                                                                                             
transfer under circumstances where jurisdiction is improper.  See MOORE ET AL., supra note 
1, § 111.02. 
133 See infra Parts II.B.3, III.B (showing how courts that used the Goldlawr analysis ran into 
difficulties with what choice of law to apply). 
134 See infra Parts II.B.3, III.B (indicating that courts used both statutes to perform the 
same function:  transfer a case when the court lacked personal jurisdiction but venue was 
proper). 
135 See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing how courts inconsistently determined which choice of 
law to apply following a transfer when venue was proper but the court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant). 
136 See supra Parts II.A.2–3 for a general discussion on which choice of law was supposed 
to apply following a venue transfer under § 1404(a) and § 1406(a). 
137 See Nelson v. Int’l Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1983); Ellis v. Great Sw. Corp., 646 
F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1981); Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967). 
138 See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523–25 (1990) (showing that even 
when a plaintiff moves for a transfer under § 1404(a), courts shall apply the law of the 
transferor court); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964) (indicating that in a 
transfer under § 1404(a), the law of the transferor court shall apply when defendants move 
for a transfer); Tel-Phonic Serv., Inc. v. TBS Int’l, Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1141 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(indicating that regardless of who made the transfer under § 1406(a), transferee court law 
must apply); LaVay Corp. v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 830 F.2d 522, 526 (4th Cir. 
1987) (citing Manley v. Engram, 755 F.2d 1463 (11th Cir. 1985)) (indicating that courts have 
generally concluded that a transferee court must apply the law of its own state following a 
transfer to avoid forum shopping by plaintiffs).  Even though the Sixth Circuit, in Martin v. 
Stokes, remanded the case without holding on to the issue of which statute of limitations to 
apply, the Sixth Circuit did comment that choice of law principles should apply.  623 F.2d 
469, 475 (6th Cir. 1980).  The Martin court indicated that the trial court had to determine 
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Essentially, courts would decide which choice of law to apply following 
a transfer based on lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant on a 
case-by-case basis.139  The Eighth Circuit was the first to deviate from 
established choice of law principles.140 
The Mayo Clinic court encountered a problem with choice of law 
based on venue transfer when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant.141  In Mayo Clinic, the case was originally filed in a district 
                                                                                                             
whether the original transferor court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant and then 
decide which law to apply based on that determination.  Id.  The Martin court said that if 
the transferor court did have jurisdiction, then the transfer would have to have been made 
under § 1404(a) and the transferor court law would apply, but if the transferor court lacked 
jurisdiction, then the transfer would have to be made under § 1406(a) and the transferee 
court law would apply.  Id.  However, the inconsistencies among the courts in which 
transfer device to use, either § 1404(a) or § 1406(a), when a court lacked jurisdiction, caused 
later courts to deviate from the standard that Martin expressed.  See Ellis, 646 F.2d 1099; 
Mayo Clinic, 383 F.2d 653. 
139 See Bayles, supra note 91, at 639. 
Considerations of efficiency relate to the allocation of judicial 
resources.  A heavy burden would be placed upon courts if each case 
were to be treated as one of first impression.  In the complete absence 
of the principle, each case could presumably be taken all the way to the 
court of final review—at least there would be no clear reason no to do 
so.  Moreover, in each case courts would have to raise anew all the 
arguments for and against each rule, even though they would 
continually arrive at the same conclusion when one rule is clearly 
preferable over another . . . Utilization of the principle of stability 
insures that few previously settled issues will be appealed . . . thereby 
enabling courts to devote their time and energy to issues of first 
impression and those involving rules which create serious injustice or 
disutility. 
Id.  However, plaintiffs should be concerned about the inconsistent results of the courts 
with venue transfer because it will delay litigation of issues on the merits, and extended 
time between the start of the law suit and trial allows a defendant to retain the value of 
judgment during the delay.  See Carrie E. Johnson, Comment, Rocket Dockets:  Reducing 
Delay in Federal Civil Litigation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 225, 231 (1997).  Also, delaying resolution 
disadvantages plaintiffs with a low economic status because they may lack the means to 
support themselves and continue the litigation.  Id.  Lastly, such high court costs may 
prevent plaintiffs from bringing valid claims in the first place to avoid the time-consuming 
and expensive process of litigation.  Id.  Thus, plaintiffs should be just as concerned about 
the inefficiency of venue transfer as defendants.  Id. 
140 See Mayo Clinic, 383 F.2d 653. 
141 Id. at 653.  There are more problems than just the statute of limitations with choice of 
law in a venue transfer when a court lacks personal jurisdiction that undermine efficiency 
and defendant rights.  See infra notes 142, 145 and accompanying text (showing that the 
true problem in Mayo Clinic was the difference of when an action commenced to begin the 
running of the statute of limitations).  However, those problems are often associated or 
linked to the statute of limitations.  See Mayo Clinic, 383 F.2d 653.  This Note often refers 
only to the statute of limitations because it serves as a particularly good example of how 
inefficient the system has become, other choice of law differences are often incorporated in 
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court where venue was proper but the court lacked personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant. 142   The Mayo Clinic court transferred under 
§ 1406(a).143  The statute of limitations had not run in either state when 
the case was filed, but it had run in both states by the time the transfer 
was made.144  However, the Mayo Clinic court faced a problem where the 
case would be barred if the state law of the transferee court applied as 
§ 1406(a) demanded, but it would not be barred if the state law of the 
transferor court applied.145   
As a result of this dilemma, the Mayo Clinic court ignored the 
established principle that transfers under § 1406(a) should apply the 
state law of the transferee court, and the Mayo Clinic court determined 
that the appropriate state law to apply was the state law of the transferor 
court.146  The Mayo Clinic court acknowledged that: 
                                                                                                             
the statute of limitations, and it is a protection often relied upon by defendants.  See id. 
(showing that a difference in choice of law service of process affects the statute of 
limitations); Eli J. Richardson, Eliminating the Limitations of Limitations Law, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1015, 1021 (1997) (describing the common viewpoint that the statute of limitations is to 
protect defendants from litigating old claims).  Further, § 1631 deals specifically with the 
issue of the statute of limitations based on the commencement of actions.  28 U.S.C. § 1631 
(2000).  Therefore, this Note focuses on the statute of limitations.  See infra Part II.C 
(providing the language and interpretation of § 1631, which incorporates statute of 
limitations problems). 
142 383 F.2d at 653.  More specifically, the case was originally filed in Illinois where venue 
was proper but the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  Id. The 
defendant moved to quash the service of process issued by the Illinois court, which was 
granted.  Id.  The plaintiff then moved to transfer the case to Minnesota where both venue 
and jurisdiction were proper.  Id.  Summons was re-issued out of the Minnesota court and 
the plaintiff had to serve the defendant again.  Id.  By this time the statute of limitations had 
run.  Id. 
143 Id. at 655; see supra notes 113–18 (explaining the Mayo Clinic decision in further detail). 
144 383 F.2d at 653. 
145 The particular problem was purely based on choice of law.  See Kaiser v. Mayo Clinic, 
260 F. Supp. 900, 908 (D. Minn. 1966).  In Illinois, “every action, unless otherwise expressly 
provided by statute, shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint.”  735 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/2-201 (2004).  In Minnesota, “[a] civil action is commenced against each defendant:  
a) when the summons is served upon that defendant.”  MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01 (2004).  Thus, if 
the transferee law of Minnesota applied, the case would be barred by the statute of 
limitations, whereas it would not be if the transferor court law of Illinois applied.  Kaiser, 
260 F. Supp. at 908.  Because the Illinois court quashed the original service of process, the 
problem arose.  Id. at 653; see also supra note 124 and accompanying text (describing this 
complex fact pattern in more detail). 
146 Mayo Clinic, 383 F.2d at 656.  (“We have reached the conclusion that under the facts 
here the law of the transferor forum should govern and that the question of 
commencement of the action is, therefore, governed by the law of Illinois.”); cf. Taylor v. 
Love, 415 F.2d 1118, 1120 (6th Cir. 1970) (“[W]e conclude that a district is ‘wrong’ within 
the meaning of § 1406 whenever there exists an ‘obstacle [to] . . . an expeditious and orderly 
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It has been stated before that the purpose for making 
transfers would be obliterated in many cases if the 
statute of limitations of the transferee forum were 
applied at the date of  transfer, and that if such were the 
rule there would be little purpose in transferring the 
case instead of dismissing it.147   
Therefore, the Mayo Clinic court held that the foundation of which state’s 
law to apply with a § 1406(a) transfer, which was typically the transferee 
court, could be changed depending on the factual situation because the 
ultimate purpose of the venue statutes was to preserve claims.148 
The Mayo Clinic court essentially used the Goldlawr analysis to 
deviate from the established rules of § 1406(a), which was to apply the 
state law of the transferee court.149  Other courts deviated from choice of 
law principles with § 1404(a) as well when transferring a case under 
§ 1404(a) when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.150 
For example, the Fifth Circuit held that the state law of the transferee 
court should apply when the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant but transfers pursuant to § 1404(a). 151   In Ellis v. Great 
                                                                                                             
adjudication’ on the merits.  Inability to perfect service of process on a defendant in an 
otherwise correct venue is such an obstacle.”); Kinergy Corp. v. Conveyor Dynamics Corp., 
No. Civ.A.3:  99CV-407-S, 2001 WL 1774435, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 6, 2001) (holding that a 
case should be transferred to another district court when the transferor court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant to preserve the claim even though the statute of 
limitations had run in the transferee court).  But cf. Froelich v. Petrelli, 472 F. Supp. 756, 763 
(D. Haw. 1979) (refusing to transfer a case under § 1406(a) because it was not in the 
plaintiff’s interests to do so when the statute of limitations had run in the transferee forum 
before the plaintiff filed in the transferor forum). 
147 383 F.2d at 656; see Porter v. Groat, 840 F.2d 255, 257 (4th Cir. 1988) (determining that a 
transfer under § 1406(a) is in the interests of justice when the statute of limitations bars the 
action in the transferor court but would not bar it in the transferee court).  But see Spar, Inc. 
v. Informational Res., Inc., 956 F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir. 1992) (prohibiting a transfer when the 
statute of limitations has run in the transferor forum because diligent plaintiffs should be 
aware of it). 
148 383 F.2d at 656.  “Also, in Goldlawr, . . .  it was held that jurisdiction was not necessary 
to toll the statute of limitations.”  Id. 
149 See  MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 111.02 (“Several circuits maintain that procedural 
obstacles other than lack of personal jurisdiction that prevent an action from proceeding in 
the original court, such as statute of limitations, make venue ‘wrong’ and thereby make, 
theoretically, Section 1406(a) the proper vehicle for transfer.”). 
150 See Ellis v. Great Sw. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1981) (utilizing a transfer under 
§ 1404(a) even though it lacked jurisdiction over the defendant because precedent 
demanded it). 
151 Id. at 1108.  In Ellis, the plaintiff filed a wrongful death action in Arkansas two years 
after his wife fell off of a “log ride” at the Six Flags Amusement Park in Arlington, Texas, 
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Southwestern Corp., 152  the Fifth Circuit determined that allowing a 
plaintiff to capture the state law of the transferor court when the court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant would be unfair to the 
defendant.153  Therefore, the Ellis court held that the state law of the 
transferee forum should apply regardless of whether § 1404(a) or 
§ 1406(a) was used when a court transferred a case because the court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 154   The Ellis court 
avoided the possible injustice to defendants, and it also deprived 
plaintiffs of a possible forum shopping mechanism.155  The Ellis court, 
                                                                                                             
which caused her death.  Id. at 1101.  The named defendants had no minimum contacts 
with Arkansas, and therefore Ellis moved for transfer.  Id.  However, it was ambiguous as 
to whether the Arkansas district court used § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) when it transferred.  Id. at 
1102.  Arkansas had a three-year statute of limitations and Texas had a two-year statute of 
limitations.  Id.  Thus, the Ellis court had to determine which choice of law applied under 
the venue transfer provisions to determine which statute of limitations to apply because if 
the Arkansas statute applied, the plaintiff’s claim endured, whereas if the Texas statute 
applied, it would be barred.  Id. 
152 646 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1981). 
153 Id. at 1108. 
When the venue in the district in which the action is brought is proper, 
but service of process cannot be had there, . . . [i]n such a situation 
plaintiff could not maintain his action in the district in which he filed 
it, and therefore could not take advantage of the law governing that 
district, since he could not obtain jurisdiction of the defendant.  
Therefore he should not be permitted to file his action there for the 
purpose of capturing the law of that jurisdiction for transportation to 
the jurisdiction in which service can be obtained. 
Id. (quoting MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 111.02 ). 
154 Id. at 1109–10. 
[W]e hold that following a 1406(a) transfer, regardless of which party 
requested the transfer or the purpose behind the transfer, the 
transferee court must apply the choice of law rules of the state in 
which it sits. . . .  [W]e hold that following a section 1404(a) transfer 
from a district in which personal jurisdiction over the defendant could 
not be obtained, the transferee court must apply the choice of law rules 
of the state in which it sits, regardless of which party requested the 
transfer. . . .  We are not presented with, and need not resolve, the 
question of which state’s choice of law rules should be applied when, 
upon the motion of a plaintiff a section 1404(a) transfer has been made 
from a district in which venue was proper and personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant had been or could have been obtained. 
Id. at 1110–11. 
155 Id. at 1110 (“The result of our holding will be to ensure that the ‘accident’ of federal 
diversity jurisdiction does not enable a party to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in 
federal court which could not have been achieved in the courts of the State where the 
action was filed.”).  But see Callan v. Lillybelle, Ltd., 39 F.R.D. 600, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) 
(determining that the Hanna outcome determinative test demands that the law of the 
transferor court should apply following a transfer under § 1404(a) when a court lacked 
jurisdiction over the defendant; otherwise the action would be barred and contravene the 
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like the Eighth Circuit in Mayo Clinic, still departed from established 
choice of law principles with venue transfer, except with § 1404(a) 
instead of § 1406(a).156   
Thus, courts deviated from established principles in choice of law 
with § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) and they disagreed on the purpose for 
straying from those principles.157  For example, Mayo Clinic averted from 
the typical choice of law application of § 1406(a), which was to apply the 
law of the transferee court, because it was compelled to preserve the 
plaintiff’s claim.158  Further, the Mayo Clinic court could not rely on 
§ 1404(a) standards, which were to apply the transferor court law, 
because it decided to use § 1406(a); consequently, it differed from 
established principles.159  Conversely, the Ellis court utilized § 1404(a) to 
transfer a case when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant and also departed from established choice of law principles 
just like the Mayo Clinic court, but its purposes for doing so was to 
                                                                                                             
remedial purpose of § 1404(a)).  For a short explanation of the Hanna outcome 
determinative test see supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
156 646 F.2d at 1110.  The Fifth Circuit truly wished to follow the logic outlined in Martin 
v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1980).  Id.; see supra note 137 and accompanying text 
(explaining the Martin analysis in applying choice of law after a venue transfer when a 
court lacks personal jurisdiction).  However, the Fifth Circuit was compelled to follow its 
own precedent, which allowed for a transfer under § 1404(a) when a court lacked 
jurisdiction.  Ellis, 436 F.2d at 1109.  Therefore, the Fifth Circuit utilized transfers under 
§ 1404(a) when a court lacked jurisdiction but deviated from which choice of law to apply 
as established in Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).  Id.; see supra notes 63–64 and 
accompanying text (describing the principle that a court should apply the state law of the 
transferor court following a transfer).  However, the Fifth Circuit did so to prevent plaintiff 
forum shopping rather than to protect plaintiff claims, as the Eighth Circuit did in Mayo 
Clinic.  646 F.2d at 1108–09; see supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing forum 
shopping and particular concerns with it in choice of law). 
157 See supra Part II.C; see also Marcus, supra note 42, at 696. 
Van Dusen did not articulate any theoretical basis for concluding that, 
by exercising the venue privilege, plaintiff acquires the right to have a 
certain state’s law apply.  Analysis ultimately leads to the conclusion 
that there is none.  Instead, the Court’s emphasis on the venue 
privilege appears to result from the absence of federal principles for 
choice of state law, turning the selection of law into a game of chess in 
which the plaintiff gets the opening move. 
Id. 
158 See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis and application 
of the Mayo Clinic decision in relation to § 1406(a)). 
159 See supra notes 107–12 and accompanying text (discussing the Berkowitz decision).  
However, even if Berkowitz did such an action, applying the transferor law after a lack of 
jurisdiction venue transfer, this result would encourage plaintiffs to forum shop because 
they could capture a state’s law that lacked jurisdiction over the defendant, and hence, the 
dilemma of the post-Goldlawr decisions.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
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preserve fairness to the defendant.160  Nelson v. International Paint Co.161 
sets precisely the standard for what courts were doing when they 
encountered this situation.162  
The Nelson court acknowledged and directly declined to follow the 
Mayo Clinic analysis.163  The Nelson court found that instances where 
transfer had been made to cure a lack of personal jurisdiction under 
either § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) required a court to apply the state law of the 
transferee court in order to prevent forum shopping and deny 
advantages to a plaintiff that he should not be entitled to have.164  Thus, 
the Nelson court transferred under § 1406(a) and held, following 
established choice of law rules with § 1406(a), that the law of the 
transferee court should apply.165  The Nelson court acknowledged Mayo 
Clinic but found its decision was factually distinguishable; thus, two 
courts applied § 1406(a) with a different choice of law decision following 
                                                 
160 See supra notes 150–55 and accompanying text (discussing the Ellis decision and 
analysis). 
161 716 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1983).  The plaintiff, Alfred Nelson, was injured when he inhaled 
toxic fumes while painting over a weld at a construction site in Alaska.  Id. at 642.  Nelson 
then sued the paint manufacturer and distributor in Texas.  Id.  The named defendant was 
International Paint Company, but the plaintiff learned that the actual manufacturer was 
Calco.  Id.  Calco moved to dismiss the complaint based on lack of personal jurisdiction.  Id.  
The district court then ordered the claim against Calco to be transferred to a court that had 
jurisdiction, a district court in California.  Id.  After transfer, Calco moved to dismiss 
because the appropriate statute of limitations in California had run.  Id. 
162 See infra notes 163–67 and accompanying text (discussing the Nelson decision and 
analysis). 
163 716 F.2d at 643–44 (“We decline to follow Mayo Clinic; it is a minority view and is 
factually distinguishable.”). 
164 Id. at 643. 
In determining whether the laws of the transferor or the transferee 
state apply to a diversity action that was transferred from one state to 
another . . . we distinguish between cases transferred for the 
convenience of one of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and cases 
transferred under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) or 1406(a) to cure a lack of 
personal jurisdiction in the district where the case was first brought.  In 
the former cases, we must apply the law of the transferor court to 
prevent parties from seeking a change in venue to take advantage of 
more favorable laws in another forum . . . .  In the latter type of cases, 
however, it is necessary to look to the law of the transferee state, also 
to prevent forum shopping, and to deny plaintiffs choice-of-law 
advantages to which they would not have been entitled in the proper 
forum. 
Id. 
165 Id. 
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the transfer.166  The end result was that courts were determining which 
choice of law to apply on a case-by-case basis.167 
Thus, Goldlawr led some courts to diverge from established 
principles of choice of law while others did not. 168   The result was 
confusion in which choice of law to apply with venue transfer 
provisions. 169   The irony, of course, was venue transfer that was 
supposed to promote efficiency was actually producing the antithesis 
because courts were wasting resources, wasting time, and attorneys 
could not be certain of the rules.170  Courts recognized this problem, and 
they attempted to remedy it by using a new transfer provision, § 1631.171   
                                                 
166 Id. at 643–44.  The Nelson court noted the Mayo Clinic decision but distinguished itself 
on the fact that one of the defendants in Nelson had not been served until the statute of 
limitations had run in both states prior to the transfer.  Id.  Despite the fact that the Nelson 
court distinguished its case from Mayo Clinic, it is important to note that it strongly held 
that transfers due to lack of personal jurisdiction should apply the transferee court law, and 
thus, the contrary results between Nelson and Mayo Clinic show the wide latitude courts 
assumed when a transfer took place.  Id. at 644. 
167 See supra Part II.B.3 (recapping how courts’ decisions were extremely varied in 
determining which state law to apply following a venue transfer when a court lacked 
personal jurisdiction). 
168 See supra Part II.B.3; see infra Part III.A (showing the background and the analysis that 
Goldlawr was the reason courts diverged from established principles of choice of law). 
169 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing how a lack of uniformity 
undercuts certainty and efficiency).  The history of the Fifth Circuit’s decisions on venue 
transfer when a court lacks personal jurisdiction is so confusing and inconsistent that the 
decisions are worth discussing to accentuate this point.  First, the Fifth Circuit reasoned by 
analogy from Goldlawr that § 1404(a) could be applied when a court lacked personal 
jurisdiction.  See Koehring Co. v. Hyde Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1963).  Later, in 
Dubin the court held that § 1406(a) could be a proper transfer provision when jurisdiction 
was lacking and venue was proper.  See Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1967).  
Ironically, the Dubin court criticized the Berkowitz court for authorizing the use of § 1404(a) 
in such situations, even though it had done so several years earlier.  Id. at 816.  Then, of 
course, Ellis and the decision it relied on, Aguacate Consol. Mines, Inc. v. Deeprock, Inc., 566 
F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1978), suggested that either § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) could be used.  See Ellis 
v. Great Sw. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1981).  Thus, the history of the Fifth Circuit 
shows how tumultuous the application of venue transfer can become, even to the point of 
the court, in essence, criticizing itself when it criticized Berkowitz.  Clearly, this example 
shows the lack of efficiency. 
170 See supra Part II.B; infra Part III; see also AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, THE 
JUDICIAL POWER OF THE COMMONWEALTH:  A REVIEW OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1903 AND 
RELATED LEGISLATION, Report no. 92 (2001), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au.  The 
Australian Law Reform Commission (“ALRC”) found that transfer procedures that are too 
complex or structurally deficient might increase litigation, result in delays, and increase 
costs.  AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra.  The ALRC also notes venue transfer 
is an integral part of a federal system to ensure that proceedings are heard as soon as 
possible.  Id. 
171 See 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2000). 
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C. Section 1631:  A Possible Redemption 
In 1982, Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1982, which reformed parts of the federal civil procedure and practice.172  
One of the laws in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 was 28 
U.S.C. § 1631.173  Some argue that § 1631’s focus on defects made at the 
time of the complaint suggests that § 1631 was meant purely for 
instances where the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.174  However, 
                                                 
172 Jeffrey W. Tayon, The Federal Transfer Statute:  28 U.S.C. § 1631, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 189 
(1987).  The main purpose of the 1982 Act was to create a new federal appellate court 
known as the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  Id. at 200.  This court 
was to be a specialized court with limited subject matter jurisdiction possessed by the 
former United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and Appellate Division of the 
Court of Claims.  Id.  Mr. Tayon asserts that § 1631 was enacted at the same time to correct 
the problem of involuntary dismissal of actions due to specific subject matter requirements.  
Id. 
173 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of 
this title or an appeal, including a petition for review of administrative 
action, is noticed for or filed with such a court and that court finds that 
there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of 
justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in which 
the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or 
noticed, and the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in 
or noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the date upon 
which it was actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is 
transferred. 
Id.  The emerging differences in the interpretation of § 1631 can best be described as a range 
of gradations rather than a circuit split.  See John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law 
Institute’s Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 978–82 (1998).  The 
most expansive approach states that § 1631 can cure any type of jurisdictional defect, 
including in rem jurisdiction.  See United States v. Am. River Transp., Inc., 150 F.R.D. 587 
(D.C. Ill. 1993).  Some courts have utilized § 1631 when there is absolutely no defect in 
personal jurisdiction at all.  See Dornbusch v. Comm’r, 860 F.2d 611, 614 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(“1631 could not reasonably be read as an implied denial of power to transfer . . . rather 
. . . 1631 was impliedly confirmatory of the inherent power to transfer in such an 
instance.”); see also Alexander v. Comm’r, 825 F.2d 499, 501–02 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (providing 
that § 1631 did not revoke the power of the court to transfer a case when jurisdiction was 
proper but venue was not, even though it did not specifically warrant it).  However, this 
Note focuses just on the analysis by courts that § 1631 authorizes transfer when a court 
lacks personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction, and the other analysis that § 1631 
is not applicable in instances when a court lacks personal jurisdiction because Goldlawr and 
its progeny dealt primarily with allowing a transfer when a court lacked personal 
jurisdiction.  See supra Part II.B. 
174 Tayon, supra note 172, at 224.  Mr. Tayon suggests that § 1631 was passed to remedy a 
specific problem dealing with subject matter jurisdiction.  Id.  He illustrates what § 1631 
solved by presenting a hypothetical: 
A nonpatent attorney represents corporate and individual defendants 
in a patent infringement suit.  As one might expect, the patent is held 
valid and infringed, and the defendants are found liable for substantial 
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the first interpretation of § 1631 by a circuit court applied a broader 
interpretation and declared that § 1631 was to be utilized specifically to 
alleviate the certainty and efficiency problems that Goldlawr and its 
progeny caused.175 
1. The Broad Interpretation 
In Ross v. Colorado Outward Bound School,176 the court was concerned 
specifically with how complicated venue transfer had become because of 
the decisions following Goldlawr.177 
                                                                                                             
sums in damages.  Sometime after . . . trial counsel files a timely notice 
of appeal with a regional circuit court of appeals.  Subsequent to this 
event, trial counsel is replaced by a patent specialist to conduct the 
appeal.  Upon review of the file, new counsel realizes that the notice of 
appeal has recited the wrong appellate court; that the appeal has been 
noticed naming the wrong appellate court; that exclusive subject 
matter jurisdiction resides in the Federal Circuit; and that the time for 
filing a notice of appeal naming the Federal Circuit had lapsed.  In 
order preserve the defendants’ rights and avoid a malpractice action 
against the nonpatent trial counsel, can dismissal of the appeal be 
avoided? 
Id. at 190.  Mr. Tayon suggests that § 1631 was meant to specifically resolve this type of 
situation because the result was that litigants were sometimes denied access to federal 
courts because of an attorney’s error or ambiguity in the jurisdictional statute.  Id. at 187, 
201.  Specifically, Mr. Tayon notes that Judge Leventhal suggested the need for such a 
statute as § 1631 in a similar type of case as the problem presented above, and Judge 
Leventhal specifically requested congressional action.  Id. at 198–99.  Shortly thereafter, 
Congress passed § 1631 in the 1982 Act.  Id. at 199–201.  Thus, the timeliness of the statute 
suggests that it was passed for this sort of reason, but Mr. Tayon provides other reasons to 
suggest that  § 1631 applies only to instances of subject matter jurisdiction as well.  Id. at 
224.  Mr. Tayon notes that because jurisdiction is determined at the time the complaint is 
filed in the transferor court, subsequent events have no effect on the subject matter 
determination.  Id.  Therefore, because personal jurisdiction depends on service of process 
and other issues subsequent to the filing of the complaint, and § 1631 seems to focus on 
jurisdictional defects apparent at the time the complaint was filed, § 1631 apparently seems 
to deal only with subject matter jurisdiction.  Id.  Further, § 1631’s legislative history 
specifically states “subject matter jurisdiction” in its language.  Id. at 201 n.60; see also infra 
note 189 and accompanying text (providing the legislative history of § 1631). 
175 See Ross v. Colo. Outward Bound Sch., 822 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1987). 
176 Id. at 1524. 
177 Id. at 1526.  (“We hold that the proper vehicle for the transfer of this action was 28 
U.S.C. § 1631.”). The action arose when Sonya Ross died in a mountain climbing accident in 
Colorado.  Id. at 1525.  Sonya was a New York resident who was attending the Colorado 
Outward Bound School.  Id.  Sonya’s mother brought this wrongful death action against the 
school in New York.  Id.  The case was originally filed in state court, but it was removed 
because there was diversity of citizenship.  Id.  In Ross, the defendant moved to dismiss an 
action in a New York district court due to lack of personal jurisdiction.  Id.  Rather than 
dismissing the action, the district court ordered a transfer to the district in Colorado 
pursuant to § 1406(a).  Id.  Once the case arrived there, the defendant moved to dismiss the 
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Prior to that date, in determining whether the laws of 
the transferor or the transferee state applied in diversity 
cases transferred from one state to another, it was 
necessary to distinguish between cases transferred 
under § 1404(a) and cases transferred under § 1406(a) — 
an often difficult task.  In the former, the law of the 
transferor state was applied . . . .  In the latter, the law of 
the transferee state was applied.178   
To alleviate the complex problem with choice of law, the Ross court 
snatched the opportunity to use a different venue transfer provision, 
§ 1631, so that § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) could function as they did before 
Goldlawr.179  Specifically, the Ross court stated:  “By statute, courts now 
know what law to apply and, more importantly in view of the facts of 
this case, when that law applies.”180  Hence, the Ross court held that the 
proper vehicle for transfer when a court lacked personal jurisdiction was 
§ 1631 rather than § 1404(a) or § 1406(a).181   
More recently, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the Tenth Circuit in 
Roman v. Ashcroft. 182   The Sixth Circuit expanded § 1631 further by 
stating that it was broad enough to cover a transfer when a court lacked 
either personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction.183  The Roman 
                                                                                                             
action on that ground that Colorado law should govern because the transfer took place 
under § 1406 and was therefore barred by the Colorado statute of limitations.  Id. at 1526.  
The Colorado court then dismissed the action.  Id.  Upon appeal, the Tenth Circuit found a 
different solution.  Id. 
178 Id. at 1527. 
179 Id.  The transferor court law was supposed to apply in situations utilizing § 1404(a) 
and transferee court law with § 1406.  Id.  The court also noted the broad construction of 
§ 1406(a), specifically pointing to those cases that utilized it where venue was proper and 
personal jurisdiction was lacking.  Id.  In a short summary, the court outlined the problem 
described in Part II of this text.  Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 1526 (“That statute requires . . . an action is transferred from one federal court to 
another federal court to cure want of jurisdiction, the action shall proceed as if it had been 
filed in the transferee court on the date upon which it was actually filed in the transferor 
court.”). 
182 340 F.3d 314 (6th Cir. 2003). 
183 Id. at 328.  Roman was a native citizen of the Dominican Republic.  Id. at 316.  In 
September of 1999, Roman pled guilty to fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other 
documents.  Id.  Hence, the INS filed charges to remove him based on (1) conviction related 
to document fraud, (2) conviction of a crime that involved moral turpitude within five 
years of entry, and (3) conviction of an aggravated felony.  Id.  316–17.  The case was 
initially filed in the Northern District Court of Ohio, but the court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.  Id. at 317.  The district court granted the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss, which was then appealed to the Sixth Circuit where it determined 
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court determined that Congress intended to give broad authority to 
permit transfers of any action between federal courts, and that courts like 
the Ross court have followed that intent by construing § 1631 broadly.184  
Further, the language of § 1631 was amply broad to support a broad 
interpretation because it only mentioned “jurisdiction” instead of any 
specific type of jurisdiction.185   
Therefore, some courts have read § 1631 broadly to allow transfer of 
a case when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant to 
alleviate the problems that Goldlawr caused with venue transfer and 
choice of law.186  However, other courts have construed § 1631 narrowly 
to apply only to instances where a court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction.187  
2. The Narrow Interpretation 
Despite the broader interpretations of § 1631, other courts were not 
willing to grant such an expansive role to § 1631.188  The legislative 
history of § 1631 specifically states that § 1631 “adds a new chapter to 
title 28 that would authorize the court in which a case is improperly filed 
to transfer it to a court where subject matter jurisdiction is proper.”189  
                                                                                                             
whether venue could be changed upon finding the court lacked personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant pursuant to § 1631.  Id. at 317, 327–28. 
184 Id. at 328. 
Through § 1631, Congress “gave broad authority to permit the transfer 
of an action between any two federal courts,” Ross, 822 F.2d at 1526, 
and courts have effectuated Congress’s intent by broadly construing 
the statute . . . .  Moreover, a broad construction of the statute is 
consistent with Congress’s intent to “protect a plaintiff against either 
additional expense or the expiration of a relevant statute of limitations 
in the event that the plaintiff makes an error in trying to select the 
proper court within the complex federal court system.” 
Id. 
185 Id. (“The literal language of the statute . . . is broad enough to encompass either [lack 
of subject matter or personal jurisdiction].”  (citing Tayon, supra note 172, at 224)). 
186 See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining the broad interpretation of § 1631 where courts utilize 
it to transfer a case when a court lacks personal jurisdiction). 
187 See infra Part II.C.2 (describing the narrow interpretation of § 1631). 
188 See Pedzewick v. Foe, 963 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1997); Levy v. Pyramid Co., 687 F. 
Supp. 48 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); see also Mortensen v. Wheel Horse Prods. Inc., 772 F. Supp. 85 
(N.D.N.Y. 1994); McTyre v. Broward Gen. Med. Ctr., 749 F. Supp. 102 (D.N.J. 1990). 
189 S. REP. NO. 97-180, at 30 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 40.  Specifically the 
legislative history follows: 
Because of the complexity of the Federal court system and of special 
jurisdictional provisions, a civil case may on occasion be mistakenly 
filed in a court—either trial or appellate—that does not have 
jurisdiction.  By the time the error is discovered, the statute of 
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Other courts acknowledged this language and used it to assert that 
§ 1631 could only be used in instances where a court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction.190   
In Levy v. Pyramid Co.,191 a Second Circuit district court rejected the 
idea that § 1631 applied to instances where the court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.192  The Levy court declined to use § 1631 
because neither the legislative history of § 1631 nor a majority of cases 
supported that idea.193  Despite the broad language of § 1631, the Levy 
court found that it only applies when a court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction and not when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant. 194   The Levy court even recognized Ross but specifically 
decided not to follow that holding.195   
                                                                                                             
limitations or a filing period may have expired.  Moreover, additional 
expense is occasioned by having to file the case anew in the proper 
court. 
 Section 301 adds a new chapter to title 28 that would authorize 
the court in which a case is improperly filed to transfer it to a court 
where subject matter jurisdiction is proper.  The case would be treated 
by the transferee court as though it had been initially filed . . . in the 
transferor court.  The plaintiff will not have to pay any additional 
filing fees.  This provision is broadly drafted to allow transfer between 
any two Federal courts.  Although most problems of misfiling have 
occurred in the district and circuit courts, others have occurred in the 
Court of International Trade and the Temporary Emergency Court of 
Appeals.  The broadly drafted provisions of section 301 will help avoid 
all of these situations. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
190 See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
191 687 F. Supp. 48.  Although the Second Circuit has never specifically held whether 
§ 1631 applies to both instances of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, it did 
apparently give some indication of its inclinations on the issue in Songbyrd Inc. v. Grossman, 
206 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2000).  The Songbyrd court specifically stated in a footnote that “[t]he 
Tenth Circuit has ruled that authority to transfer for lack of personal jurisdiction is 
provided by  28 U.S.C. § 1631 . . . but the legislative history of section 1631 provides some 
reason to believe that this section authorizes transfers only to cure lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 179 n.9. 
192 687 F. Supp. at 51.  The action arose when Sophie Levy filed a personal injury action in 
New York.  Id. at 50.  The action was originally filed in the Maryland District Court, which 
was found to not have jurisdiction over the defendant.  Id.  The action was transferred to 
New York where, again, the statute of limitations had run and the defendant motioned to 
dismiss the action.  Id. 
193 Id. at 51. 
194 Id. (“Even though that statute can be interpreted to apply to cases such as the present 
one where personal jurisdiction is lacking in the transferee court, the legislative history 
does not support such an interpretation.”). 
195 Id. at 51 n.3. 
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Hence, the inconsistent applications of § 1631 cause venue 
application to be an extremely muddled area of civil procedure, where 
uncertain rules make venue transfer inefficient.196  The vague language 
of the Goldlawr decision split courts on whether to transfer under 
§1404(a) or § 1406(a) when a court lacked personal jurisdiction,197 which 
in turn caused choice of law problems.198  Courts attempted to use § 1631 
to alleviate these problems.199  However, the lack of uniformity in the 
statute’s application resolves nothing, and furthermore, problems exist 
with the language of the statute itself. 200   Part III addresses these 
problems.201   
III.  SECTION 1631 MUST BE AMENDED TO MAKE VENUE TRANSFER EFFICIENT 
The purpose of this Part is to prove that § 1631 needs to be amended 
for three reasons.  First, because different interpretations exist with the 
application of § 1631,202  the statute should be amended to achieve a 
uniform application.203  Second, it should be amended to clearly establish 
choice of law rules that courts should apply following a transfer under 
§ 1631.204  Last, because the language of § 1631 indefinitely preserves a 
                                                                                                             
The court recognizes that in Ross v. Colorado Outward Bound School, Inc. 
. . . the court held that where the transferror [sic] court lacks personal 
jurisdiction, the transfer should be made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 
1631.  In the court’s opinion, however, the Ross decision is untenable in 
light of the explicit legislative history.  Thus, the court declines to 
follow the Tenth Circuit in that regard. 
Id. 
196 See infra Part III (discussing the problems with the inconsistent applications of § 1631). 
197 See supra Parts II.B.1–3 (discussing the problems Goldlawr caused in the application of 
§ 1404(a) and § 1406(a) when a court lacked personal jurisdiction). 
198 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing how courts split on which state law to apply following 
a venue transfer when a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant). 
199 See infra Part III.B (exploring how § 1631 resolves some of the problems caused by 
Goldlawr and its progeny). 
200 See infra Part III.B.3 (determining the problems that exist with the language of the 
statute itself). 
201 See infra Part III (providing a detailed discussion of § 1631). 
202 More than two interpretations exist, but this Note focuses on the interpretation that 
§ 1631 overrules Goldlawr and its progeny and the starkest counterpart, that § 1631 is not 
applicable, to illustrate the problem that inconsistent results have been reached because of 
the vague language of the statute.  See supra note 172 and accompanying text (looking at 
some of the other interpretations of § 1631). 
203 See supra Part II.C (describing both the narrow and broad interpretations of § 1631). 
204 See supra Part II.C.2 (presenting the analysis and utilization of the narrow 
interpretation of § 1631). 
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plaintiff’s claim, it must be amended to eliminate this detriment to the 
defendant.205  
In order to understand the need for revising § 1631, one must first 
understand the problems that Goldlawr caused that caused courts to use 
§ 1631.  Hence, Part III.A identifies § 1406(a) and Goldlawr as the root of 
the venue transfer efficiency problem.206  Next, Part III.B discusses how 
§ 1631 could have resolved these problems, why it fails, and therefore, 
why it needs revision.207 
A. The Root of the Problem 
Congress and the courts have attempted to balance three goals with 
venue transfer:  convenience and fairness for defendants, preservation of 
valid plaintiff claims, and efficiency.208  Courts first tried to hold this 
balance with forum non conveniens, but due to its inefficiency, Congress 
attempted to make venue transfer more efficient when it passed § 1404(a) 
and, to some extent, § 1406(a). 209   However, courts were unsure of 
                                                 
205 See supra Part II.C.1 (presenting how the broad interpretations works). 
206 See infra Part III.A. 
207 See infra Part III.B (discussing the problems with § 1631). 
208 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 1; supra note 35 and accompanying text (outlining the 
balance of venue).  Justice Frankfurter explained the balance between two extremes as 
follows: 
Two extremes are possible . . . (1) All venue may be determined solely 
by rigid rules, which the defendant may invoke and which work for 
convenience in the generality of cases.  In such an extreme situation 
there would be no means of responding to the special circumstances of 
particular cases when the rigid venue rules are inappropriate.  (2) At 
the other extreme there may be no rigid venue provisions, but all 
venue may be determined, upon the defendant’s objection to the 
plaintiff’s choice of forum, by a finding of fact in each case of what is 
the most convenient forum from the point of view of the parties and 
the court.  The element of undesirability in the second extreme is that it 
involves too much preliminary litigation; it is desirable in that it makes 
venue responsive to actual convenience.  The first extreme is 
undesirable for according too little, in fact nothing, to actual 
convenience when the case is a special one; it is desirable in that it does 
away with preliminary litigation. 
Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 367 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  Thus, Justice 
Frankfurter essentially suggests that the appropriate place to focus venue transfer is 
somewhere between rigid rules focusing purely on efficiency and lenient rules focusing on 
plaintiff or defendant rights.  Id.  Essentially, Justice Frankfurter’s balance seems similar to 
finding the middle point among efficiency, plaintiff’s rights, and defendant’s rights, which 
is the balance that this author suggests courts struggle to apply. 
209 See supra Part II.A.2.  More specifically, it respected plaintiffs’ rights when it allowed 
transfer without having to re-file, preserved the law of plaintiffs’ choice of forum after Van 
Dusen, applied uniformly to respect efficiency, and protected defendants’ rights much like 
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§ 1406(a)’s limits or its purpose, even though courts knew it applied 
when venue was improper.210  The main reason for this confusion is 
likely the lack of legislative history regarding the purpose of § 1406(a). 211 
Another cause for this confusion was the codification of forum non 
conveniens in § 1404(a).212  Whatever the reason, the root of the problem is 
with the enigmatic § 1406(a) and the case that defined its purpose, 
Goldlawr.213   
The Goldlawr Court defined the purpose of § 1406(a) with vague 
language, which in turn resulted in later courts interpreting Goldlawr as 
setting out a new purpose for all venue transfers.214  The new purpose 
was to remove any obstacle that prevented a plaintiff’s claim from 
expeditious and orderly adjudication.215  Goldlawr could be read as a 
limited decision only outlining the purpose of § 1406(a) and only 
pertaining to cases in which venue was improper.216  However, later 
courts determined that the lack of personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant was the obstacle that Goldlawr was referring to with its vague 
language. 217   As a result, the vague purpose that Goldlawr asserted 
allowed other courts to determine that § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) performed 
                                                                                                             
forum non convienens by granting them the ability to transfer a case if a plaintiff was trying 
to claim an inconvenient forum.  Id. 
210 See supra notes 77–83 and accompanying text.  Section 1406(a) makes no mention of 
the law to be applied once transfer has occurred.  Moreover, the statute does not detail the 
precise jurisdictional requirements of either the transferee or transferor courts. 
211 See supra notes 77–83 (pointing out that the legislative history of § 1406 provides no 
purpose for the statute). 
212 See supra notes 50, 52–58 (stating that § 1404(a) appeared to be a codification of forum 
non conveniens). 
213 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 111.02.  “The difficulty that the courts have had in 
determining which transfer statute to apply stems from a confusion regarding the 
relationship between venue and personal jurisdiction resulting from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman.”  Id. 
214 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.  The Court specifically mentioned § 1406(a) 
in one sentence:  “The language of § 1406(a) is amply broad enough to authorize the 
transfer of cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing his case.”  See supra 
note 94 and accompanying text.  However, the next sentence says nothing of any statute, 
either § 1404(a) or § 1406(a), and instead simply asserts a purpose of procedure, which is 
the sentence all courts relied upon following Goldlawr.  See supra note 94 and accompanying 
text; see also Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1980); Corke v. Sameiet M.S. Song, 572 
F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1978); Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967); Dubin v. United 
States, 380 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1967). 
215 See supra note 94 and accompanying text (stating the language that was the basis for 
this idea). 
216 See supra note 94 and accompanying text (specifically mentioning only § 1406(a) and 
not § 1404(a)). 
217 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing that the Goldlawr decision only mentions § 1406(a) and 
never mentions § 1404(a)); see also Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 466 (1962). 
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the same function when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.218  The ensuing disagreement among courts over whether to 
use § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) to transfer a case when a court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant created inefficiency because there were 
differences in which state’s law applied following each respective 
transfer provision.219   
Sections 1404(a) and 1406(a) used varying language and functioned 
differently, 220  but they were functioning equivalently when a court 
transferred a case in which it lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.221  Congress passed two distinct statutes, and it is illogical for 
them to function identically; yet, the circuits have remained divided on 
which transfer provision applies when a court lacks personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant.222  The decision between whether to use § 1404(a) or 
§ 1406(a) is crucial because each statute dictates a specific state’s law to 
apply after the transfer. 223   Hence, § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) should 
function differently because they have different consequences. 224  
However, because § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) were functioning similarly, the 
consequences that followed these statutes after Goldlawr resulted in 
                                                 
218 See Finzi, supra note 6, at 986–87.  Goldlawr did not specify whether the lack of 
jurisdiction or lack of venue was the basis for allowing the transfer; hence, courts faced a 
dilemma when they heard cases where venue was proper but they lacked jurisdiction 
because Goldlawr did not provide the answer.  Id.  As stated, being faithful to the language 
of the statutes and established principles placed a more incompetent plaintiff in a better 
position than a less incompetent plaintiff, and courts were simply not willing to allow this 
inequity to happen.  Id.  Hence, courts searched for various approaches to extend Goldlawr 
to this situation to alleviate this injustice, like the Berkowitz court did in applying Goldlawr 
to §1404(a).  Id.  What all these courts failed to recognize is that while they alleviated one 
injustice, they were creating another injustice by cutting into efficiency by deviating from 
concrete rules. 
219 See supra note 94 and accompanying text (setting forth the language used in Goldlawr); 
see also Part II.B.2 and accompanying notes (stating how courts applied § 1404(a) and 
§ 1406(a)). 
220 See supra notes 51, 69 and accompanying text (providing the specific language of each 
statute). 
221 See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining how courts used both § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) to 
transfer a case when a court lacked jurisdiction but venue was proper). 
222 See supra Part II.B.2. 
223 See supra Parts II.A.2–3 (explaining that under § 1404(a) courts generally apply the 
state law of  the transferor court, while under § 1406(a) courts generally apply the state law 
of the transferee court); see also Part II.B.3 (explaining how complicated and inconsistent 
courts were in determining which state law followed a transfer under either § 1404(a) or 
§ 1406(a) when those provisions were used to transfer a case when venue was proper but a 
court lacked personal jurisdiction). 
224 See supra Part II.A (explaining the general function of both § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) in 
how they are used and the choice of law that follows each in a transfer). 
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choice of law issues that made venue transfer unworkable.225  Therefore, 
courts used § 1631 in an attempt to remedy the problems that Goldlawr 
and its progeny caused.226 
B. Section 1631:  The Near Remedy of Goldlawr and Its Problems 
Section 1631 almost remedied the problems that Goldlawr and its 
progeny caused.227  Goldlawr did not take into account that courts would 
use § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) for venue transfer when they lacked personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.228  Furthermore, Goldlawr did not predict 
the effect its decision would have upon choice of law following venue 
transfer. 229   With § 1631, whether it used § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) in a 
transfer in which a court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
was irrelevant because § 1631 would supercede the application of both 
§ 1404(a) and § 1406(a).230  Thus, § 1631 abolished the question of which 
venue transfer provision to use.  
Section 1631 also cleared up some of the choice of law problems; 
specifically, it dealt with the statute of limitations problem.231  Courts 
were unsure whether to use Goldlawr to deviate from established choice 
of law rules with § 1404(a) and § 1406(a), or more specifically, courts 
                                                 
225 See Bayles, supra note 91, at 640 (“If courts were to decide each case afresh without 
regard to precedent, they might reach opposite conclusions in relevantly similar cases.”).  
Such a result would undermine certainty and efficiency.  See Paul E. Loving, The Justice of 
Certainty, 73 OR. L. REV. 743, 746 (1994) (“Certainty achieves fairness to those who rely upon 
the law, efficiency in following precedent, continuity and equality in treating similar cases 
equally.” (quoting McGregor Co. v. Heritage, 631 P.2d 1355, 1366 (Or. 1981))). 
226 See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining how the Ross court used § 1631 to alleviate the 
inefficient venue transfer system). 
227 Justice Harlan suggested from the start that the problem encountered in Goldlawr was 
a problem best left to Congress, and ironically, the Ross court may have recognized Justice 
Harlan’s idea when it determined that § 1631 would be the dominating transfer statute 
when personal jurisdiction was lacking.  See Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 468 (1962) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (“In these circumstances I think the matter is better left for further 
action by Congress.”). 
228 See supra Part II.B (discussing how several courts varied in whether to use § 1404(a) or 
§ 1406(a) in a transfer when the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant when 
venue was proper). 
229 See supra Part II.B.1 (covering the Goldlawr opinion). 
230 See supra Part II.C.1 (presenting the Ross court’s analysis of the application of § 1631 
and explaining that it supercedes § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) in transfers when a court lacks 
personal jurisdiction); see also Oakley, supra note 173, at 981 (“If section 1631 permits 
transfer to cure a lack of personal jurisdiction, it moots the need for a strained construction 
of either section 1404 or section 1406 to permit such a transfer in ‘the interests of justice.’”). 
231 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the split in whether to apply Goldlawr to overcome 
choice of law problems that would result in dismissal and hence be an obstruction to 
efficient adjudication). 
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were unsure whether to apply the statute of limitations of the transferee 
state or transferor state.232  Section 1631 rendered this question irrelevant 
because the language of § 1631 assumed the action in the transferee 
forum was technically filed on the day it was initiated in the transferor 
forum. 233   Hence, the concern of the Mayo Clinic court, in which a 
plaintiff’s claim could be barred by the transferee statute of limitations if 
the transferee law applied, evaporated.234   
Finally, § 1631 allowed § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) to operate in the 
capacity that they did before Goldlawr, which reinforced certain, uniform 
venue transfer rules.235  Because § 1631 applied when a court lacked 
personal jurisdiction, § 1406(a) would apply only when venue was 
improper and § 1404(a) would apply only when venue was proper.236  
Further, each venue transfer provision would suggest that certain state 
law be applied following the respective transfer of each transfer 
provision.237  Despite these remedies, § 1631 has three major problems:  
(1) inconsistent applications of the statute, (2) a lack of clarity regarding 
choice of law following transfer, and (3) inherently unfair application 
toward defendants.238 
                                                 
232 See supra Parts II.B.2–3 (discussing the choice of law problems that resulted from the 
analysis of Goldlawr). 
233 See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Ross court’s application of § 1631 and that the 
transferee forum had to assume the action was filed there the same day it was filed in the 
transferor forum). 
234 See supra notes 140–49 and accompanying text (discussing the concern of the Mayo 
Clinic court). 
235 Loving, supra note 225, at 763–64. 
Justice Peterson’s certain rule is a just rule because certainty enables an 
individual to conform his or her conduct to the law . . . .  This promotes 
business innovation and development by letting firms know what they 
can and cannot do.  Further, by eliminating speculation as to what the 
law is and avoiding a need for interpretation, clarification, or 
explanation, certainty promotes efficiency for businesses and 
individuals . . . .  The certain rule allows an individual to contemplate 
his or her actions based on an understanding that he or she knows will 
not change when he or she reaches the courtroom doors. 
Id. 
236 See supra Part III.B.1 (identifying the problem where courts split on using § 1404(a) 
and § 1406(a) in applying transfers when a court lacks personal jurisdiction). 
237 See supra Parts II.A.2–3 (explaining how § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) function and that 
different choice of law follows a venue transfer under each provision). 
238 See infra Parts III.B.1–3 (discussing the problems with § 1631 in detail). 
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1. Problem One:  Inconsistent Results of  § 1631 
The first problem with § 1631 is that courts currently disagree over 
whether § 1631 even applies when courts lack personal jurisdiction 
because the legislative history specifically mentions “subject-matter 
jurisdiction” while the statute mentions only “jurisdiction.”239   Thus, 
currently there is no uniformity in the application of § 1631 or certainty 
in how to interpret § 1631.240  If § 1631 cannot be used to transfer a case 
when a court lacks personal jurisdiction, the only process left to use is 
the old inefficient system stemming from Goldlawr, which utilizes both 
§ 1404(a) and § 1406(a).241  Moreover, because courts cannot agree on 
§ 1631’s application, matters are confused further because courts must 
also consider whether to use § 1631 on top of the analysis of Goldlawr and 
its progeny. 242  
The district courts that do not apply § 1631 convincingly argue that 
§ 1631 only applies to instances of subject matter jurisdiction.243  The 
legislative history of § 1631 only mentions subject matter jurisdiction, 
and these courts cannot be criticized for utilizing legislative history as a 
tool for determining the function of § 1631 because legislative history is a 
major tool courts use when analyzing the function of statutes.244  Even 
though no court has applied the old analysis under Goldlawr, this narrow 
                                                 
239 See infra Part II.C; see also Oakley, supra note 173, at 979 (“Rather than constituting a 
simple binary circuit split, the cases construing section 1631 can best be described as 
encompassing a range of gradations.”). 
240 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (explaining why lack of certainty and 
uniformity erode efficiency). 
241 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the inefficiency that resulted when courts were unsure 
of whether to extend Goldlawr past choice of law protections). 
242 See Bayles, supra note 91, at 639 (“When cases at the trial level clearly fall within the 
boundaries of a precedent, it saves time and money for all involved to follow precedent.”). 
Unless the Courts establish and maintain certainty and stability in the 
law, businessmen cannot safely and wisely make contracts with their 
employees or with each other; the meaning of wills, bonds, contracts, 
deeds, and leases will fluctuate and change with each change in the 
personnel or in the changing views of a Court; property interests will 
be jeopardized and frequently lost or changed; Government cannot 
adequately protect law-abiding persons or communities against 
criminals; private citizens will not know their rights and obligations; 
and public officials will not know from week to week or month to 
month the powers and limitations of government. 
Id. at 637–38 (quoting Chief Justice Bell of Pennsylvania). 
243 See supra Part II.C.2 (explaining that the courts that do not follow § 1631 do so because 
the legislative history of § 1631 only mentions that a case may be transferred when it lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction). 
244 See supra note 189 and accompanying text (providing the legislative history of § 1631). 
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interpretation of § 1631 means that the old case law and process still 
exist, which reveals that venue transfer problems remain unresolved.245  
Therefore, once again, efficiency is undermined due to uncertainty and 
lack of uniformity in venue transfer application.246   
2. Problem Two:  Section 1631 Does Not Specify Which Choice of Law 
to Apply 
The second problem is that the statute itself does not specify which 
state’s law applies following a venue transfer.247  The language of the 
statute provides that the case should be treated as if it were originally 
filed in the transferee court, but there is no specific language that 
suggests that the law of the transferee court should apply.248  Hence, the 
opportunity exists for varied interpretation due to the lack of specificity 
in the statute.  This problem should be corrected to establish a clear rule, 
allowing courts to determine, and attorneys to expect, which law will 
apply following a venue transfer. 249 
3.  Problem Three:  The Language of § 1631 is too Detrimental to 
Defendants 
The third problem is that § 1631 allows a plaintiff to manipulate the 
system, which is unfair to defendants.250  Section 1631 overrides the 
choice of law protections that courts like the Nelson court tried to extend 
to avoid plaintiff forum shopping.251  From the plaintiff’s perspective, 
courts throwing out valid claims through bars such as personal 
jurisdiction and the statute of limitations are legitimate concerns. 252  
                                                 
245 See supra Part III.A (discussing the problems Goldlawr caused). 
246 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (indicating why lack of uniformity results in 
inefficiency). 
247 See supra note 173 and accompanying text (providing the exact text of § 1631). 
248 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra Part II.B.3 (indicating the difficulty courts have when it is unclear which 
choice of law to apply following a venue transfer). 
250 See supra Part II.C (discussing the specific application of § 1631).  It should be noted 
that this Note focuses on the application of choice of law between competing states based 
on transfers from diversity jurisdiction.  A completely separate issue is a transfer pursuant 
to § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) based on a federal question.  For an application of choice of law 
and venue transfer pursuant to federal question issues, see MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, 
§ 111.20(2).  While application of § 1631 to instances of federal question cases would further 
promote efficiency, the analysis of that situation is simply too large of an issue and is 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
251 See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text (discussing the Nelson court opinion 
and concerns). 
252 See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text (showing the concerns for plaintiff 
claims by the Goldlawr Court).  This was the concern the Goldlawr Court was worried about 
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However, plaintiffs and courts like Goldlawr fail to notice that these 
“elusive facts” exist to protect defendants.253   
Even though Congress eliminated the harsh results of dismissal with 
forum non conveniens by passing § 1404(a),254 the Goldlawr court wrongly 
interpreted § 1406(a) as a device that trumped the requirement that a 
court dismiss a case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.255  With forum non conveniens, the forum is valid and the 
problem is that mere inconvenience warrants a dismissal.256 Congress 
deemed this to be a harsh result and passed § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) to 
remedy such situations with forum non conveniens.257  However, with 
personal jurisdiction, dismissal is justified because the court has no 
power over the defendant. 258   The Goldlawr court failed to state the 
reason for dismissal when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant, which is to protect the defendant.259  The Court justified its 
                                                                                                             
when a plaintiff’s claim could be dismissed because of an erroneous guess to an elusive fact 
such as jurisdiction, but what the Court failed to notice is that this “elusive fact” was there 
for a reason:  to protect defendants.  See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text; see also 
supra notes 138–47 and accompanying text (discussing the Mayo Clinic analysis with choice 
of law).  The Mayo Clinic court took these worries even further past the statute of 
limitations.  See supra notes 138–47 and accompanying text.  Other arguments that plaintiffs 
worry about is that they may be lulled into a false sense of security by negotiations with 
defendants that may cause a plaintiff to refrain from bringing a claim, which warrants the 
result of Goldlawr.  See Froelich v. Petrelli, 472 F. Supp. 756, 761 (D. Haw. 1979).  A court 
should only utilize such estoppel when the defendant, by words, acts, and conduct, led the 
plaintiff to believe it would pay the claim and then breaks off negotiations when the time 
for the suit has passed.  See Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067, 1071 (7th Cir. 
1978). 
253 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (describing personal jurisdiction generally 
and the protections it offers to defendants); see also Page, supra note 35, at 1158–60 
(describing personal jurisdiction as a guarantee that defendants receive treatment in a 
manner consistent with the Due Process Clause). 
254 See supra notes 52–59 and accompanying text (discussing why Congress passed 
§ 1404(a)). 
255 See supra Part II.B.1 (observing the Goldlawr opinion). 
256 See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the function of forum non convienens). 
257 See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing forum non convienens, how it operated, and why 
§ 1404(a) was passed to supercede its general operation among federal courts). 
258 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing personal jurisdiction and why it 
is a protection for defendants and normally warrants dismissal). 
259 Clearly the lower court’s analysis was much more sound: 
Section 1406(a) provides for the transfer of cases when venue is 
improper.  It does not mention jurisdictional defects.  Whatever be the 
desirability of a rule that a district court may transfer a case when 
venue is mislaid and jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is 
lacking, it is an unwarranted exercise of judicial interpretation to find 
that a statute, expressly providing for transfer to cure a venue defect, 
Butler: Venue Transfer When a Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction:  Where a
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
836 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
decision by stating that it was more efficient to preserve a plaintiff’s 
claim rather than dismiss a case.260  Hence, after Goldlawr, some courts 
determined that a plaintiff’s claim should be preserved indefinitely, 
which is simply taking venue transfer too far.   
The broad interpretation of § 1631 essentially codifies this 
interpretation because it first allows a transfer and then considers the 
action filed in the transferee court on the day it was originally filed in the 
transferor court.261  Thus, with the broad interpretation of § 1631, if the 
statute of limitations had run after the action was filed in the improper 
court, it would not matter, and defendants essentially lose the protection 
of the statute of limitations.262  This interpretation removes too many 
protections for defendants.263 
Despite the fact that plaintiffs may lose valid claims when a case is 
dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction or choice of law concerns, allowing 
a plaintiff’s claim to inevitably be preserved removes protections that 
defendants rely on and undermines the adversarial system.264  Further, it 
                                                                                                             
impliedly provides for a transfer to cure a more basic jurisdictional 
defect.  The lesser does not by implication include the greater. 
Goldlawr v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579, 582 (2d Cir. 1961), rev’d 369 U.S. 463 (1962) (emphasis 
added).  Also, the Goldlawr dissent, written by Justice Harlan, probably best describes the 
problem with Goldlawr.  369 U.S. 463, 467–68 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Justice Harlan 
argued: 
The notion that a District Court may deal with an in personam action in 
such a way as possibly to affect a defendant’s substantive rights 
without first acquiring jurisdiction over him is not a familiar one in 
federal jurisprudence.  No one suggests that Congress was aware that 
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) might be so used when it enacted that statute.  The 
“interest of justice” of which the statute speaks and which the Court’s 
opinion emphasizes in support of its construction of § 1406(a) is 
assuredly not a one-way street. 
Id. 
260 See supra note 94 and accompanying text (setting out the language in Goldlawr that 
creates this problem). 
261 See Part II.C.1; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2000) (“[T]he action or appeal shall proceed as 
if it had been filed in or noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the date upon 
which it was actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is transferred.”). 
262 See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the broad interpretation). 
263 See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the competing concerns between courts on whether to 
extend protection to plaintiffs or defendants). 
264 See Richardson, supra note 141, at 1021 (“Statutes of limitations, it has been said, ‘are 
designed to prevent unreasonable delay in the enforcement of legal rights.’ . . .  This 
viewpoint specifically acknowledges that plaintiffs should be permitted to enforce their 
rights, provided that they do so without unreasonable delay.”).  Allowing plaintiffs to have 
their claims preserved over defects in personal jurisdiction and the statutes of limitations 
drastically decreases the diligence a plaintiff is expected to practice when filing a claim.  Id.; 
see also supra note 74 (discussing the problems and concerns with forum shopping). 
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encourages plaintiffs to forum shop because their claims are preserved 
indefinitely.265  Both the Ellis and Nelson courts determined that it was 
unfair for a plaintiff to circumvent the statute of limitations through 
venue transfer when jurisdiction was improper.266  If a plaintiff’s claim 
was preserved indefinitely, a plaintiff would have no reason to practice 
diligence when he knows that his claim will always be preserved, and he 
could forum shop to capture the law he wanted.267  Courts like Nelson 
and Ellis recognized this problem and were unwilling to make the 
adversary system so lopsided.268  Therefore, at least in some circuits, 
indefinite preservation of a plaintiff’s claim was stopped before courts 
even used § 1631.269  The problem is that the inherent language of § 1631 
essentially codifies the principle that plaintiff claims will be preserved 
indefinitely. 
However, the counterargument to this analysis is that if a defendant 
has already prepared to adjudicate a claim, the claim is not “stale,” and 
the protection of the statute of limitations is irrelevant.270  Yet, allowing 
plaintiffs to circumvent the statute of limitations promotes forum 
shopping and undermines the adversarial system because a plaintiff can 
also capture more favorable choice of law benefits besides the statute of 
limitations. 271   Further, it remains much easier and more certain to 
dismiss a claim that fails to meet the statute of limitations than it is to 
                                                 
265 See supra notes 140–49 and accompanying text (discussing the Mayo Clinic case where 
analysis was set forth that essentially preserved a plaintiff’s claim indefinitely). 
266 See supra notes 150–67 and accompanying text (discussing the opinions of the Ellis and 
Nelson courts). 
267 See supra note 264 and accompanying text (discussing why plaintiffs would need to 
file less diligently). 
268 See supra notes 150–67 and accompanying text (providing that both the Ellis and 
Nelson courts stated that it would be unfair to allow plaintiffs to capture choice of law and 
forum shop by applying the transferor court law based on a transfer when a court lacked 
jurisdiction over the defendant). 
269 See supra notes 150–67 and accompanying text. 
270 See Richardson, supra note 141, at 1020.  Mr. Richardson states: 
[T]he objective of limitations law is to protect defendants from the 
difficulty of defending against “stale,” i.e., old, claims.  Such protection 
is generally viewed as a simple matter of fairness to defendants. . . .  
Some cases have stated that the statutes of limitations are intended to 
protect would be “defendants from stale claims brought after 
memories have faded” or evidence and witnesses have been lost . . . .  
According to other cases, statutes are enacted to “encourage the 
prompt presentation of claims to assure fairness to defendants.” 
Id.  However, it is difficult to say that a claim has “faded” after the defendants have already 
prepared to litigate. 
271 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing forum shopping); see also supra 
note 263 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of diligence problem). 
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create exceptions “in the interests of justice” to preserve a plaintiff’s 
claim following transfer.272  By once again looking to the purpose of 
venue transfer, which is efficiency, § 1631 should be amended to err on 
the more certain and efficient result of not circumventing the statute of 
limitations.273 
In conclusion, although § 1631 sought to resolve the Goldlawr 
problems, the statute must be revised to operate effectively.274  First, the 
current inconsistencies with § 1631 do not allow it to resolve the 
problems Goldlawr and its progeny caused in venue transfers when a 
court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant.275  Second, § 1631 is 
not specific enough in stating which law will apply following a transfer, 
and this uncertainty may lead to discrepancies among courts in the 
future. 276   Third, allowing transfers by a court that lacks personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant permits courts to remove additional 
defendant protections in order to preserve a plaintiff’s claim.277  The 
language of § 1631 essentially codifies this problem.278 
Clearly, the purpose of venue transfer has come a long way since 
forum non convienens.279  Section 1631 has the potential to fix the Goldlawr 
problems, but it must be amended to (1) resolve the discrepancy on 
whether § 1631 should be used, (2) specify which choice of law is to 
apply, and (3) better protect defendants.280   
                                                 
272 See supra note 173 and accompanying text (providing the language of § 1631, which 
includes the words “in the interest of justice”). 
273 See supra notes 235, 242 and accompanying text (discussing how certain and uniform 
rules promote efficiency); see also supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the 
purpose of venue transfer and generally promoting efficiency). 
274 See supra Parts III.A–B. 
Although the ultimate application of the appropriate statute of 
limitations is a comparatively simple business, the intermediate 
inquiry of which state’s statute of limitations should be applied leads 
us on a merry chase through the murky area in which the Erie doctrine 
and the federal change of venue statutes intersect. 
Ellis v. Great Sw. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1100–01 (5th Cir. 1981). 
275 See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing this particular problem with § 1631). 
276 See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the second problem with the application of § 1631). 
277 See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the third problem with the application of § 1631). 
278 See supra note 173 (providing the language of § 1631). 
279 See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the purpose of forum non conveniens). 
280 See infra Part IV (providing the reasoning for the amendments as well as the 
amendments to § 1631 themselves). 
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IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Venue transfer has clearly lost its focus of promoting efficient 
transfer of claims.  Courts took the appropriate action by using § 1631 to 
provide a clear standard for transfer when a court lacks jurisdiction, but 
because courts are unclear regarding whether it applies and the statute 
takes too much away from defendants, the statute must be amended.  
This Note proposes that several amendments be made to § 1631.  First, 
§ 1631 must be amended to clearly indicate that it is the applicable 
statute to be used for venue transfer when a court lacks personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.  Second, § 1631 must be amended to 
specifically outline the choice of law following a § 1631 transfer.  Last, 
§ 1631 must be amended so as not to allow plaintiffs to manipulate the 
venue transfer system.  Thus, Congress should amend § 1631 as follows 
and label it subsection (a): 
(a) Whenever a district court in which a case is filed a civil 
action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this 
title or an appeal, including a petition for review of 
administrative action, is noticed for or filed with such a 
court and that court finds that there is a want of subject 
matter or personal jurisdiction, whether venue is proper or 
improper, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, 
transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in 
which the action or appeal could have been brought at 
the time it was filed or noticed, and the court to which it is 
transferred shall apply the substantive law of the state in 
which it sits to the action or appeal as if it were filed the day of 
transfer to such a court and the action or appeal shall 
proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for the court 
to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was 
actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is 
transferred.281 
Commentary 
The amended § 1631 makes the necessary changes to (1) create three 
separate venue provisions that do not appear to function the same way, 
(2) specifically define which choice of law to apply following a transfer, 
                                                 
281 28 U.S.C. § 1631.  The normal font is the language of the original statute.  The text that 
appears in italics is the proposed language the author wishes to add, and the language with 
a line through it is the language the author wishes to strike from the original statute. 
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and (3) protect defendant rights by setting a limit of how far a court must 
go to preserve a plaintiff’s claim. 
First, this change will improve the efficiency of venue transfer 
because courts will have three separate venue transfer provisions to use 
in distinct situations.  The change in the language from stating 
“jurisdiction” to “want of subject-matter or personal jurisdiction” clears 
up any discrepancies as to when the statute should be used and thus 
resolves the inconsistencies in dealing with § 1631.282  This change will 
provide courts with three separate venue transfer provisions to use in 
distinct situations, and it will clear up the blurred purpose of venue 
transfer created by Goldlawr.283  The effect of this change on § 1404(a) and 
§ 1406(a) would be beneficial because they will each function distinctly.  
Section 1404(a) will be used when venue is proper but a more convenient 
forum exists for the litigation to take place.284  Section 1406(a) will be 
used only when venue is improper and justice demands a transfer take 
place, and § 1631 will be used when either subject matter or personal 
jurisdiction is lacking, regardless of whether venue is proper.285  All three 
statutes retain the discretionary language “in the interest of justice” to 
allow courts to dismiss the action if they determine that justice demands 
it.286  The problem of Goldlawr and its progeny, where it made § 1404(a) 
                                                 
282 See supra Part III.C. 
283 See supra Part III.B.1. 
284 See Oakley, supra note 173, at 972, for a similar reasoning by proposing a change to 
§ 1404(a). 
This prospectus recommends curing the problem of overlap by 
revising subsection 1404(a) to make clear that it authorizes transfer 
only when dictated by convenience interests, not the need to save the 
plaintiff from the prejudicial consequences of having brought suit in a 
court without proper subject-matter jurisdiction, venue, or personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant. 
Id. 
285 Id.  Professor Oakley provides a different approach to fixing the Goldlawr problems.  
“Section 1631 . . . should be revised to make clear that it is the vehicle for transfer to cure a 
lack of subject—matter jurisdiction.  Section 1406 should be broadened to make express 
what some courts have implied:  that it permits transfer for lack of personal jurisdiction as 
well as improper venue.”  Id.  The only problem with this amendment to § 1406(a) and 
§ 1631 is that § 1406(a) does not take into account choice of law following a transfer, and 
thus the problem identified in Part III.B.2 would not be resolved.  Hence, the author’s 
proposed amendment to § 1631 widens the application of § 1631 to both subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction, allows the choice of law clause included in the statute to apply to 
both instances, and clears up the problem with choice of law created by Goldlawr because 
courts know they have to apply the transferee court law as ordered by Congress. 
286 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interests 
of justice, a district court may transfer.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district 
in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it 
be in the interest of justice, transfer such case.”). 
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and § 1406(a) function equivalently, is resolved.287  Therefore, thinking 
back to our friend Kate, because the court lacked personal jurisdiction 
over Kate’s client, there should be no discrepancy in which venue 
transfer provision to use, and the applicable statute would clearly be 
§ 1631.288  
Second, the amended changes will make all cases that applied the 
Goldlawr analysis in either choice of law or venue transfer obsolete, 
including Goldlawr itself, because the new § 1631 tells courts which law 
to apply.289  Hence, the original purpose of venue transfer, the promotion 
of efficiency, is reinstated, and any claim that involves issues like that 
between Kate and Sally would use § 1631 if the court lacked jurisdiction,  
§ 1406(a) if the court was an improper venue, and § 1404(a) if the original 
venue was proper but inconvenient.290 
Third, this change still respects the preservation of plaintiffs’ claims 
because a plaintiff is permitted to make a transfer even when the court 
lacks jurisdiction over the defendant. 291   Hence, the concern of the 
Goldlawr court that such dismissals are inefficient or unfair is 
preserved.292   However, the amended § 1631 also protects defendant 
rights by not allowing circumvention of all actions that would result in 
dismissal. 293   The change in the language at the end of the statute 
requires that the transferee court apply the state law where it sits upon 
the day it arrives.  The amended § 1631 removes the original language 
that allows the action to commence in the transferee court as if it were 
filed on the day it was filed in the transferor court.  The amendment 
essentially codifies the decision of the Nelson court. 294   This change 
allows the statute of limitations in the transferee forum to continue 
running even after the plaintiff has filed his claim in the improper forum.  
Plaintiffs will no longer be able to gamble at acquiring beneficial law 
because their claims will not necessarily be preserved indefinitely.  Most 
importantly, this change reinstates important defendant rights contained 
in choice of law analysis such as the statute of limitations.  A claim like 
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291 See supra Part III.B.3. 
292 See supra Part II.B.1. 
293 See supra Part III.B.3. 
294 See Nelson v. Int’l Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is necessary to look 
to the law of the transferee state, also to prevent forum shopping, and to deny plaintiffs 
choice-of-law advantages to which they would not have been entitled in the proper 
forum.”). 
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Sally’s would be barred, and Kate’s client would not have to worry about 
losing the protection of the Iowa statute of limitations.295  Hence, the 
amended § 1631 respects the balance between plaintiff and defendant 
rights.   
Further, in order to avoid any confusion on the definition of “district 
court,” the following language should be added as subsection (b) to 
§ 1631: 
(b) As used in this section, the term “district court” 
includes the District Court of Guam, the District Court 
for the Northern Mariana Islands, and the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands, and the term “district” includes the 
territorial jurisdiction of each such court.296 
Commentary 
This proposed section simply transports the language used in both 
§ 1404(a) and § 1406(a) into § 1631. 297   Hence, the use of identical 
language in all three statutes will solidify them as companion sections to 
be applied to transfer cases.  Further, it will promote uniformity and 
                                                 
295 See supra Part I. 
296 This subsection is the verbatim language used in both § 1404(d) and § 1406(c).  See 
supra notes 52, 69 and accompanying text.  It appears nowhere in the original text of the 
statute, nor does the original statute contain a subsection (b).  Adding this subsection clears 
up exactly what courts should use the new § 1631(a) when making a transfer, and it is 
meant to clear up the language from the beginning of the old § 1631, which stated:  
“Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this title.”  See supra 
note 173 and accompanying text (emphasis added).  The change is meant to alleviate the 
concern raised by Mr. Tayon, that “[t]his definition of ‘courts’ excludes certain courts.  
Therefore, the express legislative intent to provide a provision which ‘is broadly drafted to 
permit transfer between any two federal courts’ has not been realized.”  See Tayon, supra 
note 173, at 225.  Mr. Tayon’s amendment, which differs, reads as follows: 
(b) The term “court” as employed by this provision shall include any 
state or federal administrative, legislative or judicial tribunal. 
Id. at 231. 
297 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(d). 
As used in this section, the term “district court” includes the District of 
Guam, the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, and the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the term “district” includes 
the territorial jurisdiction of each such court. 
Id. 
As used in this section, the term “district court” includes the District of 
Guam, the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, and the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the term “district” includes 
the territorial jurisdiction of each such court. 
28 U.S.C. § 1406(c). 
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certainty by outlining that all district courts can use the new § 1631 
transfer statute to transfer a case when a court lacks jurisdiction, just like 
all courts can use § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) to transfer a case when venue is 
proper or improper.298 
V.  CONCLUSION:  A BRICK IN THE WALL 
Kate would have much less of a headache if § 1631 were amended in 
a way that properly balanced the plaintiff’s choice of forum, defendant 
protections, and efficiency.  Not all problems with venue transfer 
efficiency would be resolved, but at least the problems caused by 
Goldlawr and its progeny would disappear.  With courts unsure of 
whether to use § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) and which choice of law to apply, it 
is no wonder that Kate’s lawsuit became so confusing before even 
reaching the merits.  Further, the varied application of § 1631 
undermined Sally’s attempt to resolve the lawsuit.  The proposed 
amendment to § 1631 would make Kate and Sally’s action proceed in a 
more efficient fashion, as Kate would expect, because the court would 
have to transfer under § 1631.  Furthermore, Kate would not have to 
worry about venue transfer being so unfair because the statute of 
limitations could no longer be circumvented.  Essentially, both Sally and 
Kate could predict the court’s decision and whether the action could 
continue.  Amending § 1631 would be one small step in making venue 
transfer more efficient, but at least every Sally and every Kate would 
know where courts were going with 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 
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